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Reference Practices
J. Hoult Verkerket
A lively debate has raged in recent years about how to regu-
late employment reference practices. According to the conven-
tional account, employers refuse to provide candid references be-
cause they fear defamation liability and perceive only the most
speculative benefits from exposing themselves to the risk of suit.'
As a result, almost everyone appears to agree that employers are
getting too little information about prospective employees.2 Al-
though there is considerably less agreement about the proper re-
sponse to this problem, a number of commentators have sug-
gested reforming defamation law or imposing disclosure obliga-
tions on former employers.' In this Article, I examine these and
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' See, for example, Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment Refer-
ences: Problems of 'Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev 45,
51-53 (1995); Diane Arthur, Recruiting, Interviewing, Selecting & Orienting New Employ-
ees 231 (Amacom 2d ed 1991); Robert D. Gatewood and Hubert S. Feild, Human Resource
Selection 411-12 (Dryden 2d ed 1990); John B. Miner and Mary Green Miner, Personnel
and Industrial Relations:A Managerial Approach 332 (Macmillan 4th ed 1985).
' See, for example, Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 45-46 (cited in note 1); Society
for Human Resource Management, Reference Checking Leaves Employers in the Dark,
SHRM Survey Says (June 26, 1995) ("SIRM Survey") (reporting survey results indicating
that more than 50 percent of employers find reference information that they receive on
personality traits and violent or bizarre behavior of potential hires to be inadequate). See
also David C. Martin and Kathryn M. Bartol, Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving
Discharged Employees, 13 Employee Rel L J 43, 44 (1987) (noting that employers are re-
luctant to give out information); Kyle E. Skopic, Comment, Potential Employer Liability
for Employee References, 21 U Richmond L Rev 427, 452-53 (1987) (same).
See Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 76-113 (cited in note 1) (proposing a slight ex-
pansion of the qualified privilege: imposition of a limited affirmative duty on employees to
provide reference information, and shifting of litigation fees in some reference practice
suits); Edward R. Horkan, Note, Contracting Around the Law of Defamation and Em-
ployment References, 79 Va L Rev 517, 536-47 (1993) (arguing for enforcement of employ-
ment contracts that modify the qualified privilege); Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Re-
ferral: A Potential Theory for Employer Liability, 64 S Cal L Rev 1645, 1667-71 (1991)
(proposing the creation of a negligent referral tort); Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer
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other possible regulatory responses to the dearth of reference in-
formation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I conclude that
defamation law functions reasonably well in its present form,
that disclosure obligations might well produce more harm than
good, and finally that the most promising legal reforms are those
that focus on the problems associated with hiring for high-risk oc-
cupations. I also explore how the law might facilitate both pre-
existing and innovative market mechanisms for information
sharing.
In order to make the informational problems of employers
more concrete, consider the following only partly hypothetical
story.4 An eighth-grade student alleges that her teacher made
sexual advances and exposed himself to her during an after-
school session concerning her science fair project. The school's
principal finds the allegations credible and threatens to discharge
the teacher immediately unless he agrees to resign at the end of
the school year. Rather than facing the stigma of a disciplinary
discharge, the teacher decides to resign, and in exchange, the
principal agrees not to mention the alleged sexual misconduct to
prospective employers who inquire about his performance. Armed
with a letter of reference recounting the laudatory information in
his recent performance appraisals, the teacher quickly finds a po-
sition at another school, once again teaching eighth-grade sci-
ence. Some months later, a student at the new school reports that
the teacher sexually assaulted her. Had prospective employers
known of the initial complaint of sexual misconduct, it is doubtful
that the teacher would have found another similar position, and
at least one student might have been spared the trauma of sexual
Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining References and Chilled Communications
in the Workplace, 40 Hastings L J 687, 713-22 (1989) (advocating the elimination of puni-
tive damages and the use of an "enhanced" standard of negligence in place of the qualified
privilege in employer defamation cases); John B. Lewis, Bruce L. Ottley, and Gregory V.
Mersol, Defamation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54
Mo L Rev 797, 854-62 (1989) (proposing to abolish the distinction between libel and slan-
der; adopt uniform standards for recovery, malice, and publication; limit punitive dam-
ages; and abolish presumed damages); 0. Lee Reed and Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the
Flow of Truthful Personnel Information: Some Needed Change in the Standard Required
to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 Am Bus L J 305, 320-23 (1988) (advo-
cating the adoption of a knowing falsity standard for defamation in qualified privilege
cases). See also Valerie L. Acoff, Comment, References Available on Request... Not! Em-
ployers Are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job References, 17 Am J Trial Advoc 755,
770-71 (1994) (suggesting that employers and former employees agree on a reference that
is satisfactory to both).
4 The story adds some factual embellishments to the basic scenario described in
Randi W. v Muroc Joint Unified School District, 14 Cal 4th 1066, 929 P2d 582, 585-86
(1997), and Cohen v Wales, 133 AD2d 94, 518 NYS2d 633, 633-34 (NY App Div 1987).
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abuse. A lack of candid reference information thus impedes em-
ployers' efforts to avoid such hiring mistakes.
An intuitively appealing response to this problem would be to
impose on the former employer a duty to disclose.5 Another obvi-
ous possibility is to reform defamation law so as to reduce the
threat of liability that employers face when they provide candid
references.' Although these are plausible policy options, prior
commentators have seriously underestimated the difficulty of de-
signing appropriate legal reforms. The framework that I develop
in this Article highlights the unique problems associated with
regulating information flows and reveals complex interactions
among the various legal and economic forces that influence em-
ployment reference practices. Although this analysis leads me to
conclude that aggressive legal reforms would be ill advised, the
framework also identifies some specific circumstances in which
more modest reforms might be productive.
I begin with the proposition that labor market efficiency de-
pends to a great extent on matching workers' strengths and
weaknesses to the jobs that they will perform. If, however, em-
ployers have inadequate information about prospective employ-
ees, they are unable to create good matches through prudent
hiring and job assignment decisions. Nevertheless, after observ-
ing workers on the job for some time, employers acquire the rele-
vant information. At this point, they can retain their most pro-
ductive employees and discharge or lay off those who are the least
productive. The resulting employee turnover allows terminated
workers to search for another job that better matches their abili-
ties.7 In this way, employee turnover promotes efficiency.
I argue, however, that employee turnover, in combination
with imperfect and asymmetric information, can also cause three
' See Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 91-99 (cited in note 1); Swerdlow, Note, 64 S
Cal L Rev at 1661 (cited in note 3).
' See Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 77-90 (cited in note 1); Lewis, Ottley, and
Mersol, 54 Mo L Rev at 855-62 (cited in note 3); Reed and Henkel, 26 Am Bus L J at 320-
23 (cited in note 3).
' See, for example, C.J. McKenna, Uncertainty and the Labour Market: Recent Devel-
opments in Job-Search Theory 62-66 (Harvester 1985) (arguing that much of the turnover
results from an inefficient match between employer and employee); Robert M. Feinberg,
Theoretical Implications and Empirical Tests of the Job Search Theory 23-28 (Garland
1984) (noting that some unemployment may be efficient because former employees can
search for jobs that better fit their economic value); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and
the Theory of Turnover 13-60 (Garland 1984) (presenting statistical model showing that
both employers and new employees analyze the economic efficiency of their relationship
and will decide whether to continue it after an initial period of time necessary to make
that determination). As I discuss below, discharge can also deter misconduct, incapacitate
unproductive workers, or signal employee productivity to the labor market. See Section
H.B.2.
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significant inefficiencies. "Mismatching" can occur whenever em-
ployers have inadequate information about the characteristics of
prospective employees. "Churning" results when employees, such
as our lecherous science teacher, move from one position to an-
other without improving the quality of the match between worker
and job. Finally, "scarring" occurs when employers rely on labor
market signals to refuse to hire workers who could be employed
productively.' The complex interactions among these labor mar-
ket phenomena, coupled with the inherent difficulty of regulating
information flows, ensure that first-best efficiency is unattain-
able.'
The economic framework that I develop suggests that the
search for second-best solutions must confront an inevitable
trade-off between the quantity and the quality of available infor-
mation concerning employee productivity. It is easy to imagine
regulatory measures that would encourage employers to provide
more reference information or would deter them from providing
falsely positive references. However, the inescapable trade-off be-
tween quantity and quality substantially weakens the case for
these reforms. Thus, for example, defamation law allegedly deters
employers from providing candid references but at the same time
it creates a much needed incentive to take precautions against
providing falsely negative references. Reforms that would relax
current liability rules can be justified only if they would increase
the available quantity of information about former employees suf-
ficiently to compensate for the concomitant decline in quality.
Similarly, a limited disclosure obligation might increase the sup-
ply of reference information, but the analysis of scarring demon-
strates that partial disclosure may well be worse than no disclo-
sure at all. Finally, the problem of falsely positive references has
led some courts to consider creating a tort of wrongful referral.
8 Although economists recently have begun to theorize about similar problems, I am
unaware of any prior theoretical discussion of employee churning and scarring. For recent
work concerning asymmetric information in the labor market, see Chun Chang and Yijang
Wang, Human Capital Investment Under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjec-
ture Revisited, 14 J Labor Econ 505 (1996); Robert Gibbons and Lawrence F. Katz, Layoffs
and Lemons, 9 J Labor Econ 351 (1991); Joan E. Ricarti Costa, Managerial Task Assign-
ment and Promotions, 56 Econometrica 449 (1988); Bruce C. Greenwald, Adverse Selection
in the Labour Market, 53 Rev Econ Studies 325 (1986); Michael Waldman, Job Assign-
ments, Signalling, and Efficiency, 15 Rand J Econ 255 (1984). None of these authors con-
siders the implications of his or her analysis for the legal regulation of employee turnover
or employment reference practices.
In the analysis that follows, informational asymmetry is the only source of market
failure or inefficiency. A first-best equilibrium thus is synonymous with a full-information
equilibrium. First-best efficiency requires either that parties become fully informed or
that they behave as if they possessed all relevant information.
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However, high enforcement costs, and a significant chance that
the threat of wrongful referral liability would deter employers
from providing any reference information at all, help to explain
why so few courts have entertained this theory of liability.
The economic framework that I develop to examine employ-
ment reference practices thus makes me skeptical that aggressive
legal reforms will improve labor market efficiency. The existing
combination of defamation liability for falsely negative references
and the conditional common interest privilege' ° applicable to sup-
plying reference information strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween quantity and quality concerns. Nevertheless, the special
risks associated with some hiring mistakes suggest the need to
consider other, more modest, regulatory reforms. Lawmakers
thus might consider adopting targeted reporting and disclosure
systems for certain high-risk occupations. More generally, courts
and legislators could try to encourage market mechanisms that
produce and disseminate reference information. By clarifying the
legal effect of various forms of reference transactions, a well ar-
ticulated regulatory scheme could aid the efforts of market par-
ticipants to pursue innovative arrangements for information
sharing.
My analysis of these issues unfolds in three main parts. Sec-
tion I describes the nature of the problem and existing legal rules
affecting the flow of information in the labor market. Section II
develops a theoretical account of the interaction between em-
ployee turnover and employers' access to information about em-
ployee productivity. Section III applies this framework to the
regulation of employment reference practices. The Conclusion
summarizes the argument and explains how the analysis also
may produce insights concerning other significant legal issues.
I. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Prospective employers use the information contained in em-
ployment references to make hiring and job assignment decisions
and to determine how much training, supervision, and monitor-
ing new employees will require. Thus, just as the school that
hired the science teacher in our earlier example would have liked
to have known about his prior sexual misconduct, so also do air-
lines try to identify pilots who have a history of substance abuse;
trucking companies attempt to avoid hiring reckless drivers; and
investment firms hope to screen out rogue brokers who have
10 For a description of the conditional common interest privilege, see notes 22-26 and
accompanying text.
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abused their clients' trust." In high-risk situations such as these,
hiring mistakes can cause tragic social losses. The resulting em-
ployee misconduct also severely erodes an employer's business
reputation and may produce ruinous liability judgments under
the doctrines of respondeat superior and negligent hiring or re-
tention. 2 Even in less extreme circumstances, however, informa-
tion about applicants' prior job performance is quite valuable.
Employers hiring clerical employees, factory workers, middle
managers, and academic administrators care deeply about the
productivity, reliability, and adaptability of job applicants. Em-
ployment references thus have tremendous potential to assist all
employers with the difficult task of assessing prospective employ-
ees.13
The legal rules applicable to employment reference practices
affect both the quantity and the quality of information that em-
ployers receive. Prospective employers and regulators confront
three analytically distinct problems: falsely negative references,
an inadequate supply of reference information, and falsely posi-
tive references. In addition, legal rules affect the vitality of the
market for reference information. Courts and legislatures have
responded to these challenges with a diverse collection of regula-
tory measures.
A. Falsely Negative References
The common law's answer to the problem of falsely negative
references is the tort of defamation. As applied to employment
reference practices, defamation law holds employers liable for
" Regulatory agencies in transportation industries also have been active in efforts to
identify high-risk individuals. In 1991, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") began a program aimed at matching the names of licensed pilots with records of
alcohol-related traffic offenses. Two convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol
could trigger FAA action leading to the revocation of a pilot's license. See Lawrence L.
Knutson, NTSB Lauds FAA Effort to Identify Problem Drinkers Among Pilots, Associated
Press (July 9, 1991).
"See, for example, Summers v Cotton Trucking, 1996 WL 451124, 21 Trials Dig 2d 75
(reporting a $3,192,000 award of compensatory and punitive damages by a California jury
for a negligent retention claim); Ortega v Ancira, 1996 WL 402776, 20 Trials Dig 2d 90
(reporting a $4,200,000 award of general damages by a California jury for a negligent re-
tention claim involving sexual molestation by a school teacher); Tallahassee Furniture Co
v Harrison, 583 S2d 744, 754 (Fla Dist Ct App 1991) (affirming a $2,500,000 award of
compensatory and punitive damages on a negligent hiring and retention claim); Plains
Resources, Inc v Gable, 253 Kan 580, 682 P2d 653, 663 (1984) (affirming award of
$1,282,569 in compensatory and punitive damages on negligent retention claim and under
respondeat superior).
" See, for example, Gatewood and Feild, Human Resource Selection at 402 (cited in
note 1); Miner and Miner, Personnel and Industrial Relations: A Managerial Approach at
330 (cited in note 1).
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providing references that contain false and defamatory state-
ments.'4 A statement is defamatory if it tends to lower the subject
in the esteem of others. 5 Thus, the tort reaches not only negative
factual assertions but also derogatory subjective judgments from
which a listener might infer the existence of negative facts about
someone.
16
Courts impose defamation liability principally to deter em-
ployers from unjustly harming a former employee's chances for
re-employment. 7 In this sense, the tort closely resembles many
other legal efforts to deter harmful conduct. Courts have ac-
knowledged explicitly that employment references play an impor-
tant and socially beneficial role in the labor market. 8 Courts
therefore would prefer not to deter false references at the cost of
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977); Lewis v Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, 361 NW2d 875, 882 (Minn Ct App 1985) (holding former em-
ployer liable for defamatory reference to prospective employer), affd in part, revd in part,
389 NW2d 876 (Minn 1986); Vinson v Linn-Mar Community School District, 360 NW2d
108, 117-18 (Iowa 1984) (affiming finding of liability for defamatory reference by former
employer).
I See, for example, Zinda v Louisiana Pacific Corp, 149 Wis 2d 913, 440 NW2d 548,
552 (1989) ("[C]ommunication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another
so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associ-
ating or dealing with him.") (citation omitted).
"See Sigal Construction Corp v Stanbury, 586 A2d 1204, 1209 (DC 1991) (discussing
liability for defamatory facts inferred from statements of "opinion" in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1 (1990)). Although a number of
courts have held that statements of opinion are not actionable, see Matthew W. Finkin,
Privacy in Employment Law 92 (BNA 1995), almost all of these decisions predate Milk-
ovich. Courts considering this issue in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision may well
expand the scope of actionable statements to include many statements formerly consid-
ered nondefamatory "opinion."
" Of course, the tort of defamation also aims to protect a person's general reputation.
As applied to employment references, however, the overriding concern is with prospects
for re-employment. See, for example, Linafelt v Bev, Inc, 662 S2d 986, 988 (Fla Dist Ct
App 1995) (Prospective employer, who expressed willingness to hire plaintiff subject to an
acceptable employment reference, did not hire him after being told that Linafelt had been
discharged for violation of company policy and would never be considered for rehire.);
Yandle v Mitchell Motors, Inc, 199 Ga App 211, 404 SE2d 313, 314 (1991) (A note in the
former employee's personnel file describing the reason for termination as lack of sales ef-
fort and resultant low production was read to prospective employers.); Weissman v Sri
Lanka Curry House, Inc, 469 NW2d 471, 471 (Minn Ct App 1991) (Plaintiff sued former
employer after a prospective employer was given a reference that stated that she was "un-
reliable," "dishonest," and had "walked out."); Ramsay v Mary Inogene Bassett Hospital,
158 AD2d 754, 551 NYS2d 342, 343 (NY App Div 1990) (Plaintiff discovered that his for-
mer employer had been giving negative references to prospective employers, which pre-
vented him from securing a new job.).
" See Rimmer v Colt Industries Operating Corp, 656 F2d 323, 328 (8th Cir 1981) (rec-
ognizing the value of regulating reference letters to both employers and employees); Hett v
Plotz, 20 Wis 2d 55, 121 NW2d 270, 273 (1963) (noting a public interest in conditionally
privileging communications such as reference letters). See also Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 596 ("The rule is based on the fact that one is entitled to learn from his associates
what is being done in a manner in which he has an interest in common.").
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eliminating this useful activity altogether. Faced with the threat
of defamation liability for false statements, however, a rational
employer might well decide that the risk of liability outweighs
the benefit of providing candid references.19 In short, the referring
employer bears the risk of liability while the prospective em-
ployer reaps all of the benefits. 0 Defamation liability could quite
19 An important behavioral puzzle is why employers freely record and share informa-
tion internally while being unwilling to disseminate the same information outside the
company. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, defamation doctrine draws no
distinction whatsoever between internal publication and external publication of negative
information. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 comment e; Lund v Chicago & NW
Transportation Co, 467 NW2d 366, 368 (Minn Ct App 1991) (holding that to be actionable
"a statement must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff"); Luttrell v
United Telephone System, Inc, 9 Kan App 2d 620, 683 P2d 1292, 1294 (1984), affd, 236
Kan 710, 695 P2d .1279 (1985) (refusing to grant greater freedom from defamation liability
for internal communications than for external communications). One possibility is that
this difference in behavior results from the fact that the returns an employer can expect
from sharing information externally are negligible as compared to the benefit of internal
communications. The process of making day-to-day management decisions about employ-
ees demands that employers share information internally. Moreover, because defending
claims of unjust or discriminatory discharge requires employers to document a legitimate
basis for their decisions, the potential benefit of gathering negative information about
someone they plan to discharge is extremely high. However, the benefits that employers
obtain by sharing this information with other employers are considerably less obvious. But
see Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willborn, Employer (ir)rationality and the Demise
of Employment References, 30 Am Bus L J 123, 126 (1992) (discussing potential benefits
employers may derive from establishing a policy of providing candid references).
However, there is another significant difference between internal and external dis-
semination of information about employees. When information is gathered and shared in-
ternally, it typically concerns incumbent employees. In contrast, external requests for in-
formation invariably concern either former employees or current employees who will soon
leave their jobs. The risk that former employees will sue for defamation is substantially
greater than the risk that incumbent employees will sue. See John J. Donohue, II[ and Pe-
ter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan L
Rev 983, 1015, 1031 (1991) (noting that most employment discrimination cases brought
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission involve termination charges; few
suits are brought by current employees). Indeed, defamation claims are seldomly pursued
separately. The majority of litigated defamation claims appear to involve former employ-
ees and are brought in conjunction with another statutory, tort, or contract claim alleging
wrongful discharge. See, for example, White v General Motors Corp, 908 F2d 675, 679
(10th Cir 1990) (action for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and slander); Linafelt,
662 S2d at 986 (former employee sued for unlawful discharge, defamation, breach of con-
tract, and intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship). The
greater propensity of discharged employees to pursue legal action against their former
employer creates a dramatic difference in the litigation risk from sharing information in-
ternally about incumbents and the risk from sharing externally the same sort of informa-
tion about former employees. Thus, a comparison of both the litigation risk and the ex-
pected benefits from collecting and sharing information about employees favors internal
over external dissemination.
' Ramona Paetzold and Steve Willborn have argued creatively that a policy of giving
candid references tends to encourage more productive employees to apply because they
know that a favorable reference will help them to obtain a new job if they need one. See
Paetzold and Willborn, 30 Am Bus L J at 126 (cited in note 19) ("Reference-giving by an
employer may also aid employees in self-selection. Productive employees will prefer to
[65:115
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easily chill this socially beneficial activity, thus causing employ-
ers to provide an inadequate supply of reference information.
B. Activity-Level Problems
To address this activity-level or quantity problem,2' the
common law has developed the conditional "common interest"
privilege.' Because former and prospective employers are
deemed to have a common interest in information about job ap-
plicants, employers who provide references are immune from
defamation liability unless plaintiffs can prove that they abused
the privilege in some way.' Plaintiffs most commonly assert that
their former employer abused the privilege by knowingly or
recklessly making false and defamatory statements to a prospec-
tive employer.' Because employment references so often involve
work for an employer who issues references, whereas nonproductive employees will prefer
to work for an employer who does not give out performance-related reference information.
This self-selection mechanism will enable employers who give references to develop more
productive workforces."). It may be unrealistic to assume that prospective employees have
an interest in and information about the reference practices of their potential employer.
See Section ILA and note 122 and accompanying text, discussing informational obstacles
that prevent an employer from developing a reputation among employees for providing in-
accurate references. In any case, many employers appear unconvinced that the benefits of
candid reference-giving exceed its costs.
21 In analyzing the effects of tort law, legal economists customarily distinguish be-
tween (1) the influence that the law has on actors' investments in precautions and (2) its
related "activity-level" effect on the extent to which actors engage in the regulated activ-
ity. See, for example, Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J Legal Stud 1,
2-3 (1980). As applied to the regulation of employment reference practices, this analysis
distinguishes the efforts employers make to improve the quality of employment references
(i.e., precautions against providing falsely negative or falsely positive references) from
their decision about how often to provide references at all. An employer who decides to
confirm only former employees' job titles and dates of service improves the quality of in-
formation provided (inaccuracies in reporting these facts are extremely unlikely) but at
the expense of reducing the quantity of information that will be available to prospective
employers.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596.
Courts routinely have held that the common interest privilege extends to employ-
ment references. See, for example, Zinda, 440 NW2d at 552 ("[T]he prospective employer
has an interest in receiving information concerning the character and qualifications of the
former employee, and the ex-employer has an interest in giving such information in good
faith to insure that he may receive an honest evaluation when he hires new employers.");
Hett, 121 NW2d at 273 (quoting Lord Blackburn) ("Where a person is so situated that it
becomes right in the interest of society that he should tell to a third person facts, then, if
he bona fide and without malice does tell them, it is a privileged communication."). Also
note that some courts and commentators refer to a "qualified privilege" rather than a
"conditional privilege." The two terms are synonymous.
24 In discussing defamation claims, courts sometimes distinguish common law malice
and actual malice as a basis for finding abuse of the conditional privilege. See, for exam-
ple, Jolly v Valley Publishing Co, 63 Wash 2d 537, 388 P2d 139, 140 (1964); Gattis v Kilgo,
140 NC 106, 52 SE 249, 250 (1905); Cherry v Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 NW
323, 323 (1901); Kirkpatrick v Eagle Lodge, 26 Kan 384, 392 (1881). However, many com-
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subjective assessments of performance and disputed factual ques-
tions about an employee's work history, it can be difficult for em-
ployers to defeat defamation cases on a motion for summary
judgment.' Although the conditional privilege thus provides a
somewhat porous shield against liability, it does appear to aid
employers defending defamation actions." As a result, the privi-
lege undoubtedly ameliorates the danger that the threat of defa-
mation liability will deter employers from providing any refer-
ences at all.
Despite the conditional privilege, the literature concerning
employment references overflows with complaints that an insuffi-
mentators have criticized the use of the word "malice" to describe the standard for abuse
of the conditional privilege. See, for example, W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 115 at 833 (West 5th ed 1984) ("The word 'malice'... has plagued the
law of defamation from the beginning.").
An employer also abuses the privilege when the defamatory matter is published for
some purpose other than that for which the particular privilege is given, when the publi-
cation is made to some person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the purpose of the particular privilege, when the publication includes defamatory
matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the
occasion is privileged, or when the publication includes unprivileged matter as well as
privileged matter. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 603-05(a); Zinda, 440 NW2d at
551 (involving claim that employer abused privilege by publishing reason for employee's
discharge in company newsletter which "reached the local hospital, where... two of [the
plaintiffs wife's] co-workers read the reference to [the plaintiffs] termination").
Courts frequently observe that the question of whether an employer abused the con-
ditional privilege is a factual question for the jury, precluding summary judgment if the
plaintiff can offer evidence that an employer's statements might have been false. An em-
ployer thus could be forced to go to trial to defend a case that rests on no more evidence
than the plaintiffs own deposition testimony contradicting the employer's judgments
about his performance. See, for example, Elbeshbeshy v Franklin Institute, 618 F Supp
170, 171-72 (E D Pa 1985) (denying an employer's motion for summary judgment on
ground that plaintiffs testimony constituted "some evidence" that he had been terminated
"for reasons of professional jealousy" rather than for "lack of cooperation as the employer
had recorded in plaintiffs employment record). Although Paetzold and Willborn find that
employers often prevail on motions for summary judgment, see 30 Am Bus L J at 139
(cited in note 19), their analysis ignores the selection effect that can bias inferences about
legal rules based on studying litigated cases. See generally George L. Priest and Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984) (concluding that
the proportion of plaintiff victories in a survey of litigated cases will depend on many fac-
tors other than the stringency of the applicable legal rule). Thus, the rate of employer suc-
cesses will tend to be high if they frequently choose to settle uncertain claims and litigate
only those in which they are confident of prevailing.
See, for example, Duffy v Leading Edge Products, Inc, 44 F3d 308, 316 (5th Cir
1995) (holding that qualified privilege protected employer against claim that it had made
false allegations of sexual harassment against the plaintiff); Garvey v Dickinson College,
763 F Supp 796, 797-98 (M D Pa 1991) (holding that conditional privilege protected college
dean's statement that professor was a "hostile junior colleague" in a letter of recommenda-
tion); Judd v McCormack, 27 Mass App 167, 535 NE2d 1284, 1289-90 (1989) (holding that
letter and evaluation prepared after a firefighter was discharged because of alleged poor
performance did not abuse the conditional privilege).
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cient amount of information is available about job applicants.27
Several commentators have urged that lawmakers should in-
crease the quantity of available reference information by impos-
ing on employers some form of disclosure obligation.' Indeed,
around the turn of the century, a number of state legislatures
adopted so-called "service letter" statutes that require employers
to furnish to former employees a letter describing their service
record and stating the reason, if any, that the employee quit or
was discharged.29 In 1905, Missouri adopted its service letter
statute principally to protect workers against being unable to ob-
tain employment because their former employers had refused to
provide a letter of reference." Legislatures in Georgia, Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Texas enacted similar legislation at about the
same time and for the same purpose."' Often enacted along with
antiblacklisting laws and long before employers began to worry
about the threat of defamation liability, legislators originally con-
ceived service letter statutes as an employee rights measure.
Nevertheless, such a mandatory disclosure provision also could
play an important role in enhancing labor market information
'7 See note 2.
See Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 91-99 (cited in note 1); Swerdlow, Note, 64 S
Cal L Rev at 1667-71 (cited in note 3).
For example, the Missouri statute provided:
Whenever any employe of any corporation doing business in this state shall be dis-
charged or voluntarily quit the service of such corporation, it shall be the duty of the
superintendent or manager of said corporation, upon the request of such employe...
to issue to such employe a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager,
setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employe to such
corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such
employe has quit such service.
Mo Rev Stat § 3020 (Stephens 1909).
' As the Missouri Supreme Court later explained in passing on the constitutionality of
the statute:
Prior to the enactment of this statute a custom had grown up in this state, among
railroad and other corporations, not to employ any applicant for a position until he
gave the name of his last employer, and upon receiving the name, it would write to
said former employer, making inquiry as to the cause of the applicantfs discharge, if
discharged, or his cause for leaving the service of such former company. If the infor-
mation furnished was not satisfactory, the applicant was refused employment. This
custom became so widespread and effected [sic] such vast numbers of laboring people
it became a public evil, and worked great injustice and oppression upon large num-
bers of persons who earned their bread by the sweat of their faces.
Cheek v Prudential Insurance Co, 192 SW 387, 389 (Mo 1916), affd, 259 US 530 (1922).
" 1890-91 Ga Laws Part 1, Title 10, No 779; 1897 Kan Sess Laws 144; 1910 Okla Sess
Laws § 3769; 1909 Tex Gen Laws 89. Early decisions in Georgia, Kansas, and Texas de-
clared those states' service letter statutes void under free speech provisions of their re-
spective state constitutions. See St. Louis SW Railway Co v Griffin, 106 Tex 477, 171 SW
703, 707 (1914); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co v Brown, 80 Kan 312, 102 P
459, 461 (1909); Wallace v Georgia, C & NRailway Co, 94 Ga 732,22 SE 579, 579 (1894).
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about job applicants.32 Only three states, however, have generally
applicable service letter requirements enforceable by a private
right of action against an employer who fails to provide a letter."
Thus, in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, the condi-
' Without better empirical data on how these statutes function, however, it is impos-
sible to say definitively whether they help to overcome informational asymmetries in the
labor market.
Commentators assert that as many as fifteen states, including various combinations
of California, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington have service let-
ter statutes. See, for example, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 2 Employee Dismissal Law and Prac-
tice, app A (3d ed 1992) (listing ten states); Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 57 (cited in
note 1) (citing thirteen states); Skopic, Comment, 21 U Richmond L Rev at 439 (cited in
note 2) (identifying twelve states).
My research suggests, however, that only Missouri, Montana, and Minnesota have
statutes that are likely to have significant effects. In both Missouri and Montana, employ-
ers are required to provide a service letter describing the former employee's service and,
according to the language of the Missouri statute, "truly stating for what cause, if any,
such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit such service." Mo Stat Ann § 290.140
(West 1993); Rimmer v Colt Industries Operating Corp, 656 F2d 323, 325 (8th Cir 1981)
(applying the statute). See also Mont Code Ann § 39-2-801 (1995). Aggrieved employees
may bring a civil action for damages. Similarly, Minnesota's service letter requirement
applies generally and has generated a significant amount of litigation during the 1990s.
See Minn Stat Ann § 181.933 (West 1993); Deli v University of Minnesota, 511 NW2d 46,
50 (Minn Ct App 1994).
In Indiana and Maine, a conventional service letter is required, but there is no private
right of action. Ind Code Ann § 22-6-3-1 (West 1991 & Supp 1997); 26 Me Rev Stat Ann
§ 630 (West 1988). See also Hull v Central Transport, Inc, 628 F Supp 784, 792 (N D Ind
1986); Larrabee v Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc, 486 A2d 97, 101 (Me 1984). Similarly, the
Kansas statute provides no private right of action and requires only a statement of "the
tenure of employment, occupational classification, and wage rate paid to the employee."
Kan Stat Ann § 44-808(3) (1986). The Nevada statute does not create a private right of ac-
tion. Nev Rev Stat § 613.210(4) (1995). The Texas statute requires a service letter, but a
1915 Texas Supreme Court decision declared that the provision infringed the state consti-
tutional right to be silent that followed from the "liberty to speak." See Tex Rev Stat Ann
§§ 5196, 5196f, 5206 (Vernon 1987); Griffin, 171 SW at 705. Although a recent Texas At-
torney General's opinion opines that the Texas Supreme Court would be likely to overrule
Griffin, the provision remains void until either the legislature or the court acts to revive it.
See Tex Op Atty Gen No JM-1116, 10-11 (1989).
Statutes in California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma are limited in application to public
service corporations such as public utilities and railroads and their contractors. Cal Labor
Code § 1055 (1989); Neb Rev Stat § 48-209 (1993); 40 Okla Stat Ann § 171 (West 1986).
Ohio's statute applies only to railroad companies. See Ohio Rev Code Ann § 4973.03
(Baldwin 1995). No reported cases appear to have arisen under the California, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, or Ohio statutes since the early twentieth century cases upholding their con-
stitutionality. Finally, although the statutes in Nevada and Washington apply generally
to all employers, they also appear to have produced no reported cases. See Nev Rev Stat
§ 613.210(4) (1995); Wash Admin Code § 296-1'26-050 (1994). Perritt further cites statutes
from North Carolina and Pennsylvania. These statutes, however, concern pre-termination
notice and, as such, are not service-letter statutes. See NC Gen Stat § 126-35 (1989); 43 Pa
Stat § 291 (Purdon 1964). In summary, only three of these fifteen states have what appear
to be strong service letter statutes.
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tional privilege is the only significant regulatory response to the
activity-level problem. 4
C. Falsely Positive References
Although disclosure obligations are quite rare, by far the
least developed branch of the law regulating employment refer-
ences is the effort to combat falsely positive references. An em-
ployer who either fails to disclose or affirmatively misrepresents
adverse information about a former employee could conceivably
be held liable for negligent or fraudulent referral. Indeed, com-
mentators have urged courts to develop such a "wrongful referral"
tort.35 They argue by analogy to widely accepted common law
rules imposing liability for misrepresentations36 and requiring
disclosure in certain circumstances."
Despite quite plausible arguments for extending existing doc-
trine to cover such cases, very few courts appear to have consid-
ered this theory of liability. A New York appellate court has ex-
pressly rejected wrongful referral liability in a case involving al-
legations of sexual misconduct against a teacher." Similarly, a
' Although a comparative analysis of legal rules in other countries is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is interesting to observe that German labor law appears to impose a firm
obligation on employers to provide a detailed service letter for terminated employees. See
Matthew W. Finkin, Employee References: A Very Small Study in Comparative Law
(forthcoming in a German Festschrift, draft on file with U Chi L Rev).
"See Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 91 (cited in note 1); Swerdlow, Note, 64 S Cal
L Rev at 1670 (cited in note 3).
"A tort action is generally available for intentional or negligent misrepresentations
that result in physical harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 310, 311. Similarly, the
common law of contracts provides a remedy of rescission when one party makes a misrep-
resentation that induces another party to assent to a contract. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 164 (1981) ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a
fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is
justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.").
"See Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal 3d 425, 551 P2d 334,
348 (1976) (holding that psychotherapist whose patient presents serious danger of violence
to another has a duty to use reasonable care to protect intended victim by steps that may
include warning of the threat); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (listing conditions un-
der which there is a duty to disclose); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (asserting
that nondisclosure of a known fact can be a misrepresentation in some circumstances).
In Cohen v Wales, 133 A2d 94, 518 NYS2d 633, 634 (NY App Div 1987), the court
flatly rejects the argument that the former employer of a school teacher who had a record
of sexual misconduct was negligent for failing to disclose that fact when it recommended
the teacher to another school district. The court's one-page opinion observes that:
The common law imposes no duty to control the conduct of another or to warn those
endangered by such conduct, in the absence of a special relationship between either
the person who threatens harmful conduct or the foreseeable victim. The mere rec-
ommendation of a person for potential employment is not a proper basis for asserting
a claim of negligence where another party is responsible for the actual hiring.
See id at 634 (citations omitted).
The University of Chicago Law Review
Michigan appeals court held that a former employer had no duty
to disclose an employee's dangerous proclivities, including
twenty-four disciplinary warnings for acts ranging from alcohol
and drug use to outright violence. 9 In another case, a former em-
ployer failed to disclose to prospective employers that its em-
ployee had been observed carrying a gun in the workplace. After
obtaining and then losing a new job, the employee shot and killed
several people at his subsequent employer. A Florida trial court
ruled that plaintiffs could proceed with a suit alleging fraud, mis-
representation, and conspiracy arising out of a wrongful referral;
the case, however, settled before trial and thus produced neither
a final judgment nor an appellate ruling on this issue. °
By far the most significant judicial support for the wrongful
referral theory is a recent decision of the California Supreme
Court. In Randi W. v Muroc Joint Unified School District,4 the
court confronted a situation very similar to our hypothetical lech-
erous science teacher.' Officials from no fewer than three prior
employers wrote letters of reference containing extravagant
praise for Robert Gadams, who was seeking a job as vice-
principal at Livingston Middle School. All of these letters, how-
ever, failed to mention a long history of sexual misconduct
charges, including complaints that had caused Gadams's forced
resignation from at least one of his prior employers. The court
held that plaintiffs could state claims for negligent and inten-
tional misrepresentation, but carefully limited the cause of action
to situations in which "the recommendation letter amounts to an
affirmative misrepresentation presenting a foreseeable and sub-
stantial risk of physical harm to a third person."43 It is still too
early to tell whether this decision presages a nationwide trend
toward greater acceptance for such claims. California employ-
' Moore v St Joseph Nursing Home, Inc, 184 Mich App 766, 459 NW2d 100, 103
(1990).
See Jerner v Allstate Insurance Co, No 93-09472 (Fla Cir Ct, Aug 10, 1995) (ruling
on motion to amend complaint and to conduct discovery on punitive damages claim). The
Jerner case attracted some commentary. See Mark Hansen, Expensive Conversation Gets
Expert Disqualified, 82 ABA J 25 (Mar 1996) (reporting that the case settled before trial).
14 Cal 4th 1066, 929 P2d 582 (Cal 1997); Former Employer May Be Sued Over Ref-
erence Letter, 10 Indiv Empl Rts 1 (BNA Aug 29, 1995) (describing the case and reporting
on interviews with attorneys involved in the litigation).
, The court below in Randi W. also found support for wrongful referral liability in
Gutzan v Altair Airlines, Inc, 766 F2d 135, 141 (3d Cir 1985) (imposing liability on an em-
ployment agency for misrepresenting the circumstances surrounding a job candidate's
prior rape conviction in a military court). Randi W. v Livingston Union School District, 49
Cal Rptr 2d 471, 482 (Cal Ct App 1995). The California Supreme Court, however, rele-
gates Gutzan to a "cf." citation at the tail end of a string cite. 929 P2d at 592.
41 Randi W., 929 P2d at 584 (Cal 1997).
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ment law undoubtedly has a distinctly pro-plaintiff character, but
many other jurisdictions have followed the state's Tarasoff deci-
sion imposing a somewhat similar duty on psychiatrists." At pre-
sent, however, wrongful referral liability remains the least devel-
oped aspect of the legal regulation of employment reference prac-
tices.
D. Market Mechanisms for Information Sharing
As we have seen, the direct legal regulation of employment
reference practices affects both the quantity and quality of infor-
mation that employers receive. Despite the obvious importance of
references, however, at least two other significant market
mechanisms also produce information about job applicants. First,
many employers investigate prospective employees' backgrounds
and seek to verify statements on their application forms. Al-
though such an investigation might otherwise expose employers
to liability for invasion of privacy, the simple expedient of re-
quiring job applicants to sign a form granting consent to investi-
gate immunizes investigative efforts conducted by a prospective
employer. Courts find quite routinely that such a consent form
protects the investigating employer from suit for invasion of pri-
vacy.4
5
Many firms also require job applicants to sign a prospective
waiver of defamation liability, presumably to encourage their
former employers to provide candid references. However, the le-
gal effect of such waivers is considerably less clear than the effect
of a consent to investigate. In some jurisdictions, those providing
references may rely on a prospective waiver to confer an absolute
privilege. In other states, a prospective waiver is unenforceable
" See, for example, State v Bright, 683 A2d 1055, 1064 (Del Super Ct 1996); Hamman
v County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz 58, 775 P2d 1122, 1128 (1989); Peterson v State, 100 Wash
2d 421, 671 P2d 230, 237 (1983).
' Farrington v Sysco Food Service, Inc, 865 SW2d 247, 253 (Tex App 1993) (refusing
to find invasion of privacy by employer for drug and polygraph tests when consent was
given). Lack of consent is an element of the tort of invasion of privacy. There can be no ac-
tion for an invasion of privacy if the plaintiff has consented, the consent has not been re-
voked, and the defendant has acted within the scope of the consent. See Keeton, et al,
Torts § 117 at 867 (cited in note 24).
" See Baker v Bhajan, 117 NM 278, 871 P2d 374, 377 (1994) (enforcing prospective
waiver of defamation liability); Hardwick v Houston Lighting & Power Co, 881 SW2d 195,
198 (Tex Ct App 1994) (holding that "Ethe release establishes [ ] consent to publication");
Thailer v LaRocca, 174 AD2d 731, 571 NYS2d 569, 571 (NY App Div 1991) (holding that
"a valid release which is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and
voluntarily entered into will be enforced"). See also Cox v Nasche, 70 F3d 1030, 1032 (9th
Cir 1995) (holding that consent to publication confers an absolute privilege on employers
against defamation, even if the employer's statements were made maliciously); Smith v
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as contrary to public policy.47 But in the overwhelming majority of
U.S. jurisdictions, the legal effect of a prospective waiver is un-
certain; there is simply no reported case law addressing this im-
portant question. Thus, employers' attempts to stimulate the
market for reference information by contractual means face a de-
cidedly uncertain legal reception.
While most employers conduct their own investigation, a
substantial number now rely on informational intermediaries to
assist them in evaluating prospective employees.4" This second
approach to information gathering encompasses a broad array of
market sources of information: third party reference checking and
pre-employment investigation services, management recruiters
and headhunters, even employment agencies supplying tempo-
rary and contract labor. Each of these entities sometimes pro-
vides information about prospective employees. Defamation law
and the conditional privilege establish the basic legal framework
governing such informational intermediaries. Like employers
themselves, headhunters and temporary employment agencies
are liable for publishing false and defamatory statements about
employees, and they are likewise protected by the conditional
privilege.49 Unlike former employers, however, these intermedi-
aries need not say anything defamatory in order to prevent unde-
sirable employees from finding work. They can simply refuse to
refer or recommend such individuals to their clients. Although
defamation law might make clients reluctant to report the details
of their dissatisfaction with a particular worker, the tort of defa-
mation does not apply to an intermediary's refusal to refer or rec-
ommend someone for work. As a result, employers who hire
Holley, 827 SW2d 433, 436 (Tex Ct App 1992) (holding that consent alone bars any claim
of defamation); Patane v The Broadmoor Hotel, Inc, 708 P2d 473, 476 (Colo Ct App 1985)
(holding that "plaintiffs written consent to make inquiry of her work history" confers an
absolute privilege on former employer to discuss work history, "even if defamatory state-
ments are made"); Gengler v Phelps, 92 NM 465, 589 P2d 1056, 1058 (NM Ct App 1978)
("A former employer has absolute immunity from damages in a slander suit when the al-
leged defamation stems from an inquiry addressed to the former employer... made with
the consent of the employee.").
See Reece v Finch, 562 S2d 195, 200 (Ala 1990) (ruling that releases as to future in-
tentional tortious conduct, including defamation, are void as against public policy); Kel-
lums v Freight Sales Centers, Inc, 467 S2d 816, 818 (Fla Dist Ct App 1985) (holding that
contractual release from liability for intentional torts such as defamation violate public
policy).
48 For example, a recent survey found that 10 percent of companies engage an outside
agency to perform reference checks and 21 percent use a combination of staff and an out-
side agency. SHRM Survey (cited in note 2).
' See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558-612 (drawing no distinction between
defamation committed by employers and defamation committed by informational interme-
diaries).
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workers from these intermediaries can rely on them to be some-
what more "candid" in their referrals than former employers are
likely to be in their employment references.
Although defamation law ordinarily governs the activities of
informational intermediaries, the preparation of "investigative
reports" for employment purposes also falls under the jurisdiction
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA). 0 The statute requires
the informational intermediary to notify workers when they pro-
vide an investigative report and requires employers to notify
workers whenever they take an adverse personnel action on the
basis of information in a report."' In addition, those who prepare
such reports must disclose, upon request from the subject, any in-
formation-except medical information--contained in their files
concerning the subject of a report.5 2 The statute also establishes a
procedure for contesting information contained in a report.53 Fi-
nally, the FCRA codifies a strong conditional privilege for all
those who prepare, contribute information to, or receive covered
investigative reports. Only false information furnished with
"malice or willful intent to injure" is actionable.54
E. Calls for Reform
Most commentators appear to be dissatisfied with the legal
status quo. Many authors writing on the subject have proclaimed
that defamation law makes it impossible to obtain sufficient in-
formation about job applicants.55 Indeed, the Society for Human
Resource Management ("SHRM") recently released the results of
a survey showing that a significant percentage of its members
believe they are getting inadequate reference information.56 Legal
commentators have responded to these complaints with various
proposals for reform. Some would make it more difficult for plain-
tiffs to prevail in defamation suits." Others would impose on for-
See Pub L No 90-321, Title VI, § 602, as amended by Pub L No 91-508, Title VI,
§ 601, 84 Stat 1128 (1970), codified at 15 USC §§ 1681 et seq (1994).
51 See 15 USC §§ 1681k, 1681m.
See 15 USC § 1681g.
See 15 USC § 1681i.
See 15 USC § 1681bh
See note 2.
See SHRM Survey (cited in note 2). Participants in the survey were asked, for a va-
riety of factors, whether they were receiving an inadequate level of information on poten-
tial employees. The percentage of respondents who viewed information on the various fac-
tors as inadequate varied from 1 percent for dates of employment to 52 percent for per-
sonality traits and 54 percent for violent/bizarre behavior. Id.
' See Lewis, Ottley, and Mersol, 54 Mo L Rev at 855-62 (cited in note 3); Saxton, 13
Yale L & Policy Rev at 79 (cited in note 1).
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mer employers some form of disclosure obligation.58 Finally, a
student author would, within certain limits, permit private con-
tracts to vary the assignment of liability under defamation law.59
Although courts and legislatures have shown a great deal of
interest in the problem of regulating employment reference prac-
tices, their response to these calls for reform has been quite mod-
est. A number of state legislatures have recently adopted statu-
tory provisions conferring a "good faith" immunity on those who
provide employment references. ° These enactments vary some-
what in their specifics, but none seriously modifies the existing
structure of liability under the common law. Employers remain
subject to defamation suit for falsely negative references, and the
legislation typically codifies the existence of a conditional privi-
lege for providing reference information.61 It remains to be seen
whether such provisions will significantly increase the burden on
plaintiffs attempting to prove abuse of the privilege. However, a
plain reading of the language most commonly used in these stat-
utes suggests that dramatic change is unlikely. 2
See Saxton, 13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 91-99 (cited in note 1); Swerdlow, Note, 64 S
Cal L Rev at 1661 (cited in note 3).
See Horkan, Note, 79 Va L Rev at 546-47 (cited in note 3) (concluding that employ-
ers and employees should be free to contract around defamation law if certain conditions
are met).
' These states include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Alaska Stat § 09.65.160 (1996);
Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 23-1361(B), (C) (West 1995); Cal Civ Code § 47 (West 1992 & Supp
1997); 1994 Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-114(2); Fla Stat Ann I § 768.095 (West 1997); Ga Code
Ann I § 34-1-4 (Michie Supp 1997); Idaho Code § 44-201 (Michie 1997); La Rev Stat Ann
§ 23:291 (West Supp 1997); 26 Me Rev Stat Ann § 598 (West Supp 1996); Minn Stat
§ 181.933 (1996); NM Stat Ann § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp 1997); Ohio Rev Code Ann
§ 4113.71 (Anderson 1997); 40 Ok Stat Ann § 61 (West Supp 1997); Or Rev Stat 30.178
(1995); 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 8342 (Purdon 1982); SC Code Ann § 41-1-65 (West Supp
1996); SD Cod Laws § 60-4-12 (Supp 1997); Wis Stat Ann § 895.487 (West 1997); Wyo Stat
Ann 27-1-113 (Michie Supp 1996).
61 For example, the Alaska statute provides that "[a]n employer who discloses informa-
tion about the job performance of an employee or former employee to a prospective em-
ployer.., is presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by
a preponderance of the evidence, may not be held liable for the disclosure or its conse-
quences." Alaska Stat § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996). The presumption of good faith is rebutted
upon a showing that the employer "(1) recklessly, knowingly, or with a malicious purpose
disclosed false or deliberately misleading information;" or (2) disclosed information in
violation of a protected civil right of the employee or former employee. Id. This standard
simply codifies a conventional conditional privilege.
' See the example discussed in note 61.
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II. EMPLOYEE TURNOVER, INFORMATION, AND EFFIcIENcY
The many complaints about inadequate information suggest
that employment reference practices are a significant problem.
But this apparently serious market failure has generated a rela-
tively modest regulatory response. The puzzle is why lawmakers
have not responded more aggressively. Commentators' proposed
reforms are plausible policy options, but, as the remainder of this
Article demonstrates, their advocates have not fully appreciated
the complexity of the problem. Indeed, this complexity may well
explain the apparent reluctance of lawmakers to alter dramati-
cally the contours of existing law. My analysis focuses on the dif-
ficulty of regulating information flows and on the complex inter-
actions among the various economic and legal forces that affect
employment reference practices. In this Section, I develop a theo-
retical framework with which to analyze the relationship between
these labor market phenomena and the law governing employ-
ment reference practices. This framework helps us to understand
better both the nature of the problem and the effects of possible
remedial measures.
I begin with the observation that labor market efficiency de-
pends to a great extent on matching workers to jobs for which
they are well suited. Employee turnover-the process by which
people move from one job to another-is an essential mechanism
for improving job matching.' But under conditions of imperfect
and asymmetric information, turnover also can cause inefficient
mismatching, churning, and scarring. It is natural to ask whether
regulation could correct these labor market failures. I show that
first-best efficiency is unattainable. Inherent limitations on the
regulation of information disclosure prevent legal rules from
achieving the required full-information equilibrium, and the
complexity of the job assignment problem makes direct behav-
ioral regulation similarly impossible. Finally, I show that efforts
to develop market mechanisms for providing reference informa-
tion confront difficult coordination problems. Even if these barri-
ers to collective action could be surmounted, private efforts would
confront the same obstacles to achieving a fully efficient, full-
information equilibrium that prevent regulatory solutions from
achieving that objective.
See note 7.
19981
The University of Chicago Law Review
A. Incomplete and Asymmetric Information About Productivity
Although employers would like to know anything about a job
applicant that might affect his or her productivity, the very na-
ture of much of that information limits their ability to acquire it.
Of course, some characteristics are comparatively easy to verify.
Employers seldom have any trouble determining whether some-
one possesses a valid driver's license. Similarly, it is a routine
matter to verify educational credentials, professional certifica-
tions, and security clearances. With proper consent from job ap-
plicants, for example, secondary schools and universities readily
disclose degree information and transcripts. However, certain
types of information present special problems for employers.
A job applicant's prior work history-including job titles,
compensation, responsibilities, and accomplishments-plays a
significant role in pre-employment screening. But applicants fre-
quently misrepresent themselves, most commonly exaggerating
their responsibilities and accomplishments.' When prospective
employers attempt to verify these facts, applicants' former em-
ployers often will confirm only job titles and dates of service. 5
The prospective employer thus may find it necessary to discount
applicants' self-serving accounts of their prior achievements be-
cause of an inability to verify that information.
Employers' informational problems also have a temporal
element. Some characteristics of employees, which I will call "ex-
perience traits," become apparent only after an extended period of
observation. Experience traits are seldom discovered during a
conventional interview process; employees who are, for example,
predisposed to violence, to substance abuse, or to engaging in
sexual misconduct may function quite normally for substantial
periods of time. Instead, employers ordinarily learn about such
traits after an employee engages in inappropriate behavior on the
job: a manager's female subordinates complain frequently about
sexual harassment; a forklift operator causes several accidents; a
security guard uses excessive force to evict a trespasser.66 While
See Gatewood and Feild, Human Resource Selection at 402-03 (cited in note 1). Ex-
perts appear to agree that, depending on the position and industry, between 10 and 30
percent of all job applicants distort the truth or lie on their resumes. See Samuel Green-
gard, Avoid Negligent Hiring: Are You Well Armed to Screen Applicants?, 74 Personnel J
84, 84 (Dec 1995).
"See Bureau of National Affairs, Reference Requests on Former Employees: Selection
Procedures & Personnel Records 16 (Personnel Policies Forum No 114, Sept 1976) ("BNA
Survey').
"See, for example, Martin v Cavalier Hotel Corp, 48 F3d 1343, 1349 (4th Cir 1995)
(forcible sexual assault by hotel manager); Lusby v T.G. & Y Stores, Inc, 749 F2d 1423,
1428 (10th Cir 1984), vacated, 474 US 805 (1985) (Security guard used chokehold and
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an employees' future behavior may be impossible to predict, his
or her prior misconduct often is objectively verifiable and could be
reported by a former employer. However, problems arise when
prospective employers attempt to learn about applicants' prior
sexual harassment complaints, violent behavior, workplace acci-
dents, disciplinary actions, or attendance records. s7 Providing
such negative information creates a risk of defamation liability
while offering few clear benefits to the referring employer. In-
deed, the available empirical evidence suggests that former em-
ployers are less likely to reveal employee misconduct than any
other information about the employee.' Because prospective em-
ployers rarely have unfettered access to the details of prior mis-
conduct, highly relevant information often remains concealed
from those who must make hiring and job assignment decisions.
As a result, an employer may mistakenly hire someone who is
poorly matched for the relevant position.
Finally, many other important productive characteristics re-
quire a subjective assessment of personality traits and perform-
ance over time. This type of information combines the temporal
problems I have just described with an additional element. No
objective means exist for measuring and verifying these traits.69
Human resource managers and line supervisors inevitably form
opinions about individual workers, but these subjective assess-
ments require an extended period of observation and are inher-
ently unverifiable. Nevertheless, such judgments play a critical
role in selecting and assigning employees. Because employer poli-
struck plaintiff with pistol during effort to detain him in shoplifting incident.).
In one particularly memorable case, an insurance company discharged an employee
after observing him bring a gun to work on several occasions. Responding to a prospective
employer's inquiries, the former employer provided a neutral reference that omitted any
mention of the gun-toting incidents. After the second employer fired him, the employee re-
turned to the company cafeteria and shot and killed several members of the company's
management. See Jerner v Allstate Insurance Co, No 93-09472 (Fla Cir Ct, Aug 10, 1995).
' A recent survey found that although most employers were satisfied with the infor-
mation they received about applicants' dates of employment (96 percent), eligibility for re-
hire (65 percent), and qualification for a particular job (56 percent), a mere 11 percent of
employers felt that they received adequate information about "violent/bizarre behavior."
See SHRM Survey (cited in note 2).
' Psychological test batteries exist that measure some of the traits about which em-
ployers may be concerned. See James N. Butcher, Use of the MMPI in Personnel Selection,
in James N. Butcher, ed, New Developments in the Use of the MMPI 165, 188 (Minnesota
1979). One important limitation of these tests, however, is that they were developed in a
clinical rather than an industrial setting. The studies establishing their validity and reli-
ability for identifying psychopathology in mental patients therefore may be insufficient to
support their use as personnel screening devices. See id. My discussion in the text should
be read to apply to characteristics for which valid testing devices are not available at a
reasonable cost.
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cies usually prohibit sharing these performance appraisals with
anyone outside the company, prospective employers often must
make initial hiring and job assignment decisions without the
benefit of this information.70
As if the problem of incomplete information were not enough
to prevent efficient employee selection and assignment, partici-
pants in the labor market are also asymmetrically informed
about many worker characteristics. Consider for a moment an
analogy between the labor market and the market for used cars.
A familiar feature of the used car market is the fact that sellers
ordinarily know more than buyers about the condition of the cars
they are offering for sale. When potential sellers may choose ei-
ther to sell or to keep the car that they own after privately ob-
serving its qualities, buyers rationally fear that owners will keep
the good cars and sell the lemons. This tendency to sell lower
quality items is an example of a phenomenon economists call ad-
verse selection, or more colorfully, a "market for lemons."7 The
consequences of adverse selection range from depressing the price
in a market for lemons to eliminating altogether the market for
such goods.72
The labor market, like the used car market, can be under-
stood as a market for lemons. The hiring and firing practices of
employers in the labor market provide the mechanism for adverse
selection. Employers hire new workers from a pool that includes
new entrants to the job market; re-entrants; workers who have
been displaced by plant closings, laid off due to slack work, or dis-
charged for cause; and workers who quit their former jobs. 73 Fo-
cusing for a moment on workers who have been discharged or laid
off, we see that current employers occupy an economic position
similar to that of car owners. Just as an owner learns about her
car's reliability, an employer has an opportunity to observe each
worker's productive characteristics. Firms predictably tend to re-
tain their most productive employees and to discharge or lay off
70 See sources cited in note 2.
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons.• Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970).
See Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q J Econ 629 (1976).
" In practice, employers may not be able to distinguish reliably among various types
of workers in the pool of prospective employees. As my later discussion of employee
churning will show, for example, workers who quit may have characteristics quite similar
to those of employees who are discharged or laid-off. See Section fl.B.2 (discussing em-
ployee "churning"). Nevertheless, these categories provide a convenient means of identi-
fying more or less distinctive groups ofjob seekers.
[65:115
Employment Reference Practices
those who are less productive.74 As a result, employers should ex-
pect that the average worker who has been discharged or laid off
will be less productive than one drawn at random from the pool of
all workers. The economic theory of adverse selection thus pre-
dicts that firms will reduce their wage offers to these unemployed
workers.75 The available empirical evidence appears to support
this intuitively plausible description of firm behavior.76
B. Information and Labor Market Efficiency
What then are the consequences of these informational
problems? How do they affect efficiency in the labor market? As I
7' See Greenwald, 53 Rev Econ Stud at 325 (cited in note 8) (noting that adverse selec-
tion in the labor market can severely limit a worker's freedom to change jobs). Employees'
lack of productivity may affect only a single firm or influence productivity in many jobs at
many employers. Firm-specific productivity is of course an important efficiency concern.
However, I focus in the text on workers' more general productive characteristics because
incomplete and asymmetric information about these traits may cause inefficient employee
turnover.
"' See Greenwald, 53 Rev Econ Stud at 325 (cited in note 8) (noting that adverse selec-
tion lowers wages in the job market). If discharged and laid-off workers are indistinguish-
able from others in the pool of unemployed, then firms will reduce, by a somewhat smaller
amount, their wage offers to all unemployed workers. Indeed, even currently employed
workers may be searching for work under the threat of discharge and therefore be "lem-
ons." For the sake of simplicity, one might prefer to focus on the comparatively obvious
selection effects associated with layoff and discharge. But my later analysis of employee
churning demonstrates that more subtle forms of adverse selection are equally important
See Section II.B.2.
7' In a recent article, Robert Gibbons and Lawrence Katz discuss how asymmetric in-
formation about productivity influences wage patterns in the market for white collar
workers. Gibbons and Katz, 9 J Labor Econ at 351 (cited in note 8). Gibbons and Katz con-
struct a two-period model in which firms decide whether to lay off or retain employees af-
ter observing their productivity in the first period. In equilibrium, they show that employ-
ers choose to lay off their least productive workers, that other employers infer that laid-off
workers are less productive, and that these employers therefore offer them a low wage.
Because no such inference is justified concerning workers who lose their jobs as a result of
a plant closing, Gibbons and Katz predict that laid-off workers will earn lower re-
employment wages than workers displaced by plant closings. Their model also predicts
that laid-off workers will have longer postdisplacement unemployment spells. Finally, if
the market concludes that laid-off workers are "lemons" solely because they have been
laid-off, then predisplacement wages should not differ by cause of displacement. Using
data from the 1984 and 1986 Displaced Workers Supplements to the Current Population
Survey, Gibbons and Katz find strong support for all three predictions of their model. See
id at 353.
These empirical results are especially striking because Gibbons and Katz do not con-
trol for two factors that tend to diminish the chances of observing this wage pattern. First,
plant closings often have a severe economic effect on areas in which the closed plant was a
major source of employment. We would ordinarily expect these concentrated local em-
ployment losses to make re-employment wages lower and unemployment spells longer for
those displaced by a plant closing. Second, some employers might find it difficult to con-
firm that an applicant lost her job in a plant closing rather than as the result of a layoff.
Any uncertainty about this critical information tends to diminish the chances of observing
different wages and unemployment spells for the two groups.
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have suggested already, incomplete and asymmetric information
cause three significant inefficiencies: mismatching, churning, and
scarring. The next three subsections describe each of these labor
market failures.
1. Mismatching.
Just as individuals differ in their productive characteristics,
so also jobs differ in the demands they place on workers. The dy-
namic market process of employee turnover-driven by workers'
preferences and employers' hiring and firing decisions-ulti-
mately determines where each person will work. Thus, some peo-
ple become dissatisfied with their jobs and quit while others learn
new skills and seek promotions. Employers hire promising new
applicants and lay off or discharge unproductive incumbent em-
ployees. Labor market efficiency depends to a great extent on
matching employees' strengths and weaknesses to the require-
ments of the work that they perform. Mismatching occurs when-
ever workers are not employed at the jobs in which they will be
most productive."
The problem of mismatching is as varied as workers and oc-
cupations."8 Most of us probably think first of someone who lacks
the skills or diligence to perform his current job: an incompetent
employee who botches every assignment or a lazy slug who com-
pletes tasks only when forced to do so. Nevertheless, the obverse
problem may be equally common. Some employees are simply too
good for their present positions, as when a highly talented worker
languishes in an unchallenging job at a poorly managed company.
Mismatching also occurs when a person with valuable skills in
Although output-maximizing matching is a generally desirable objective, it may of-
ten conflict with individual utility maximization. Indeed, some theoretical models of the
general assignment problem suggest that the most preferred match for employers will be
the least desirable match for employees and vice versa. See Alvin E. Roth, Stability and
Polarization of Interests in Job Matching, 52 Econometrica 47, 56 (1984) (examining
matches in the core of a noncooperative bargaining game between employers and employ-
ees). I thus use the term "inefficient" somewhat loosely when I speak of mismatching. I in-
tend to appeal to what I take to be a widely shared intuition that we are ordinarily better
off with a larger rather than a smaller total surplus to divide among members of society.
Moreover, for the types of severe mismatching with which we should be most concerned
(for example, substance abusers operating vehicles and machinery, and sexual predators
holding jobs that give them authority over or access to potential victims), I doubt that
anyone would argue that distributional concerns should take precedence over efficient
matching.
"' For the moment, I leave to the side situations involving firm-specific mismatches.
The possibility that employers have firm-specific reasons for preferring one worker over
another undermines the potential effectiveness of regulatory measures that rely on re-
stricting employers' freedom to hire and fire at will. See Section H.C.2.
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one area tries to perform work that requires very different abili-
ties. Thus, a superb engineer may be incapable of managing a
large research and development lab, and a great scholar may
make a very poor salesman.
There is, however, one type of mismatching that is especially
significant in the analysis that follows. A mismatch may result
from a specific interaction between a worker's propensities and
the nature of the job he is performing. Thus, someone with a pro-
pensity to respond violently to stress should not work in a stress-
ful environment. Someone with a tendency to behave recklessly
should not work in a safety-sensitive position. Someone with a
history of embezzlement or financial misconduct should not work
in a position of financial responsibility. Someone prone to engag-
ing in sexual misconduct should not work in situations that cre-
ate opportunities to exploit victims. In each case, the risk of loss
from misconduct or malfeasance reduces substantially the em-
ployee's net productivity in a particular type of job.
Although employers perceive clearly the benefits of match-
ing, they often have difficulty learning relevant information. As
we have seen, it is inherently difficult to verify subjective as-
sessments of employee productivity. Experience traits become
apparent only over time, and employers concerned about the
threat of defamation liability often share no more than the most
rudimentary facts about their former employees. Armed with in-
complete information about applicants, employers inevitably
make mistakes in hiring and job assignment. The resulting mis-
matches often produce only trivial effects on productivity, but
sometimes they can cause tragic social losses. Planes, trucks, and
trains crash.79 Customers become victims of rape, assault, and
embezzlement. 0
For example, in California, a chartered bus swerved off a highway near Palm Desert
and slid fifty feet down an embankment, injuring twenty-six girls and four chaperones
headed for a weekend retreat. The driver admitted that he had taken cocaine the morning
before the crash. Marla Cone, Drug Testing on the Way for Bus Drivers, Los Angeles Times
BI (Feb 6, 1992). On January 19, 1988, a Trans-Colorado plane crashed near Bayfield,
Colorado, killing both pilots and seven passengers. Investigators discovered that one of the
pilots had used cocaine the night before the fatal crash. In addition, his pre-employment
record included a nonfatal crash landing on the wrong runway, a suspended driver's li-
cense, and five moving violations in three years. His copilot had been fired from another
regional airline for poor performance, and his record included two alcohol-related driving
convictions and one alcohol conviction not related to driving. At the time, the FAA did not
require airlines to check for alcohol or drug-related driving convictions of pilots. Julie
Schmit and John Ritter, Marginal Pilots Put Passengers' Lives at Risk, USA Today Al
(Sept 26, 1995).
"See, for example, Ohio v Mitchell, 1995 Ohio App LEXIS 5071, *9 (1995) (Defendant,
employed by Adelphia Cable, was charged with rape, attempted rape, felonious assault,
aggravated burglary, and kidnapping in connection with three separate incidents that oc-
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Employers naturally use whatever information is available to
hire and assign employees in a way that minimizes these risks.
Information plays an equally important role when employers
choose to discharge current employees. By observing employees
on the job, firms gain valuable insight into workers' productive
characteristics. For example, an employer may discover that a
forklift operator tends to be somewhat reckless, a propensity that
creates the risk of serious harm. The employer thus promotes ef-
ficient matching by discharging the worker from a position for
which he is particularly unsuited.
The more difficult it is for other employers to obtain informa-
tion about job applicants, however, the less likely it is that such
selective discharges will improve match quality. Somewhat per-
versely, employers may have the greatest incentive to conceal in-
formation about former employees precisely when that informa-
tion would be most useful to prospective employers. By remaining
silent, the discharging employer reaps the benefit of returning an
unproductive or dangerous employee to the general labor pool
and simultaneously avoids the risk of a defamation suit.8 But
this privately rational discharge decision increases the risk that
some other employer will unwittingly hire an undesirable worker.
Without adequate information about the worker, chances are
good that match quality will not improve. Thus, the same impulse
to discharge undesirable employees that ordinarily produces effi-
cient matching can also cause what I have called churning.
2. Churning.
In essence, employee churning is unproductive turnover.82
Recall for a moment the story of the teacher that I recounted in
cured after he used his employment with Adelphia as a means to enter the victims'
homes.); DRR v English Enterprises, CATV, Division of Gator Transportation, Inc, 356
NW2d 580, 582 (Iowa Ct App 1984) (Victim brought action against cable television fran-
chisee and its independent contractor who employed the installer who raped her.).
" Recall that employers face a serious threat of defamation liability only when they
disclose negative information about former employees. If employment references are the
principal means by which prospective employers learn such information about job appli-
cants, the loss of this source of information will often affect the ability of employers to
match workers to appropriate jobs.
' Although employee churning incorporates the notion of asymmetric information
about productivity that drives a market for lemons, the analysis of churning involves addi-
tional factors that play no role in a traditional lemons model. First, churning is a dynamic
process that occurs only when employee turnover produces no improvement in match
quality and no significant contribution to deterrence, incapacitation, or signaling. See
notes 89-97. In contrast, a market for lemons can develop whenever buyers and sellers
have asymmetric information about product quality. Second, employee churning involves
three rather than two interested parties. The former employer, the prospective employer,
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the introduction." His employer discovered information about
him that led the employer to conclude that he should not be
teaching eighth-grade science classes. After he agreed to resign,
however, prospective employers were unable to discover the facts
surrounding his departure. Without this critical information,
there was nothing to prevent him from obtaining a position iden-
tical to the one he had held prior to the allegation of sexual mis-
conduct. As this example illustrates, employee churning occurs
because of an informational asymmetry in the labor market.
Former employers are notoriously reluctant to provide candid as-
sessments of applicants' productivity. 4 As a result, firms often
learn critical facts about employees only after hiring them.
Employee churning is inefficient in two distinct ways. 5 First,
the original employer incurs the substantial economic costs of
discharging the undesirable employee and recruiting, screening,
and training a replacement. Every prospective employer at which
the discharged employee seeks work incurs the costs of screening.
And his new employer bears the cost of training him. The net re-
sult of this job change is to improve productivity at the original
employer, but also to produce an equal and opposite effect on pro-
ductivity at the worker's new employer. Thus, the transaction
costs of turnover are a pure social cost.86
and the job candidate all play an important role in the market dynamics of churning. A
market for lemons requires only a buyer and a seller.
See note 4 and accompanying text.
Some human resource theorists argue that a major cause of the lack of predictive
validity of reference checks is the reluctance of employers to provide negative information
about employees. See, for example, Stephen J. Carroll, Jr. and Allan N. Nash, Effective-
ness of a Forced-Choice Reference Check, 35 Personnel Administration 42, 42 (Mar-Apr
1972). Others have observed that employers sometimes write overly positive recommenda-
tions of marginal employees in an effort to get rid of the person by making them look more
attractive to prospective employers. See, for example, Milton L. Blum and James C. Nay-
lor, Industrial Psychology: Its Theoretical and Social Foundations 168 (Harper Row rev ed
1968).
Discharges and the resulting employee turnover can potentially enhance efficiency
by promoting matching, deterring misconduct, incapacitating dangerous workers, or sig-
naling employee productivity. In the remainder of this subsection, I explain how asym-
metric information impedes these potentially beneficial effects of discharge and describe
when those effects are most likely to be absent. The term "churning" refers only to situa-
tions in which these effects are negligible.
Although estimates of turnover costs vary widely for different types of jobs, these
costs can be quite considerable. See Patrick Dunn, Pre-Employment Referencing Aids Your
Bottom Line, 74 Personnel J 68, 68 (Feb 1995) (citing estimates that turnover costs aver-
age about 1.5 times the annual salary for the position in question); John J. Hogan, Turn-
over and What To Do About It, 33 Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Admin Q 40, 40 (Feb 1992)
(estimating turnover costs for managerial personnel at between $17,000 and $20,000 per
employee).
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Far more troubling, however, is the fact that employee
churning can cause severe mismatching. Prospective employers
often fail to learn about undesirable characteristics that make a
discharged worker unsuited for a particular type of job. Without
this information, subsequent employers cannot take specific pre-
cautions in job assignment or supervision that would prevent fur-
ther social losses. For instance, the second school in our earlier
example could have restricted or more closely monitored the
teacher's contact with individual students, or it might have hired
him to work in a team with another teacher. 7 As this example
suggests, once someone has learned a trade or profession, it is
possible that the most efficient response to his misconduct will be
to modify a job to accommodate the undesirable characteristic."8
In many cases, however, such precautions will be ineffective
or cost so much as to make it uneconomic for the discharged em-
ployee to continue in the same occupation. Some employee char-
acteristics create a risk of tragic losses: a plane crash, a sexual
assault, or a serious industrial accident. Unless employer precau-
tions can virtually eliminate any unusual risk of these severe
harms, the offending employee should find a lower-risk job. Thus,
we have an intuitive sense that child sex offenders should not be
working in day care centers and that reckless drivers should not
be operating delivery trucks. The lack of available information
about discharged employees that produces employee churning
creates the danger that employers will be unable to act on these
intuitions.
A disciplinary discharge and the resulting employee turnover
becomes churning, however, only when it serves no economically
useful function. Discharges for misconduct or poor performance
can enhance labor market efficiency in four distinct ways: (1) by
improving match quality; (2) by deterring employee misconduct;
(3) by incapacitating dangerous or unproductive employees; and
(4) by signaling workers' productive characteristics to prospective
employers. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.
First, discharge can improve match quality by moving an
employee to a job in which he or she is more productive. Thus, for
example, a truck driver discharged for failing a drug test or for
Similarly, the gun-toting insurance claims adjuster in Jerner, No 93-09472 (Fla Cir
Ct, Aug 10, 1995), could be subject to unannounced searches for weapons, and a drug-
abusing truck driver might be required to submit to sobriety or psycho-motor testing be-
fore and during each work shift.
' This argument bears a striking similarity to the structure of statutory duties to ac-
commodate disabled workers. See Conclusion (discussing application of the analytic
framework to disability discrimination law).
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reporting to work under the influence of alcohol might take a new
job as a day laborer. This occupational change presumably de-
creases somewhat the risk that the former driver will cause harm
to himself or others. However, the fact that the former and pro-
spective employers often possess asymmetric information about
employee misconduct significantly reduces the likelihood that
match quality will improve.89 Suppose, for example, that the
driver applies for work at another trucking company and claims
to have quit his prior job because of low pay or poor working con-
ditions or for some other innocent reason. If his former employer's
reference policy permits only disclosure of his job title and dates
of service, it is quite likely that he will soon find himself behind
the wheel of a truck again. However, this analysis obviously does
not apply to employee misconduct that produces a public record.
Prospective employers would have little trouble discovering a
drunk driving conviction or a record of moving violations." An
improved match is least likely and churning is thus most likely to
occur when it is difficult for prospective employers to learn the
reason for a discharge.
Second, the threat of discharge may deter employee miscon-
duct, since employment termination can impose a substantial
cost on discharged employees. Whether or not this deterrent in-
centive succeeds in a particular situation depends largely on the
reason why employees are unproductive. If employees have cho-
sen to exert themselves less fully or control their actions less
carefully than they could, the threat of discharge will deter
shirking to the extent that the supply of effort or self-control is
responsive to the financial and psychic sanction of discharge. An-
other possibility, however, is that some employees are innately
unproductive because of certain physical or psychological charac-
teristics. If these characteristics are outside their control, then
the sanction of discharge can have no deterrent effect. The risk of
inefficient churning thus is greatest for employees in this cate-
gory.9
Moreover, improving match quality requires that there be work available in which
the discharged employee can be more productive. Some worker characteristics are equally
undesirable for a wide range of jobs in the economy. For example, chronic tardiness
probably has roughly equivalent effects on productivity in a broad class of white collar
jobs. Moving undesirable workers among these positions cannot improve match quality.
Nevertheless, discharge may deter the misconduct or signal to other employers that such
workers are troublesome.
"For example, the SHRM Survey found that 42 percent of surveyed companies
checked the driving records of prospective employees. See SHRM Survey (cited in note 2).
" Psychologists are far from agreeing on what determines an individual's future pro-
pensity to commit antisocial acts. For example, an extensive literature debates whether it
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Even for those workers who might otherwise be expected to
respond to the threat of discharge, asymmetric information re-
duces the costs that they suffer in the event of being discharged,
thus reducing any potential deterrent effects. The more difficulty
prospective employers have discovering the truth about the work
history of discharged employees, the less trouble those employees
are likely to have finding new jobs that are as attractive as their
prior positions.92 Moreover, even if discharged workers experience
significant losses, firms still have an economically excessive in-
centive to use discharge as a disciplinary device. Employers gain
the full benefit of deterring misconduct by remaining employees,
but they bear only part of the cost of the discharge. The private
benefits of discharging an undesirable employee include both the
deterrent effect of the discharge and the expected improvement in
productivity that results from hiring a more suitable replacement
worker. To compute the net social benefits of this discharge, how-
ever, we must deduct the loss in productivity suffered by the un-
desirable worker's new employer. This divergence between the
private and social benefits of the discharge is a somewhat more
rigorous way of expressing the intuition that an employer who
passes his or her "dead wood" downstream without warning sub-
sequent employers has done something wrong.9"
is possible to predict violent behavior. See, for example, John Monahan, The Prediction of
Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 Am J Psych 10,
11 (1984); John Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior (DHHS 1981).
' It is also possible that having less information about job candidates will make em-
ployers more likely to rely on labor market signals and therefore increase the risk of scar-
ring. See Section H.B.3. However, the danger of scarring is reduced substantially when
employers cannot distinguish between discharged workers and those who have quit. Be-
cause discharged workers are a comparatively small fraction of the total pool of job seek-
ers, the mere fact of a prior job separation conveys considerably less information than the
knowledge that someone has been discharged.
' To those who do not share my intuition on this question, I can only explain how this
practice can decrease social welfare. In deciding whether or not to discharge an undesir-
able employee, an employer simply ignores the possibility that some other employer will
end up with an equally unproductive worker-job match. Similarly, the discharging em-
ployer has few incentives to provide prospective employers with the information about the
worker's productive characteristics that it has learned during the period of employment.
The combination of these two factors distorts the original employer's decision about dis-
charge as surely as freedom from liability for water or air pollution distorts the production
decisions of potential polluters. Discharges of undesirable workers, like industrial emis-
sions of airborne pollutants, impose an externality on others who use the common re-
source. This analogy is less than perfect, however, because the employer's productive pro-
cess did not alter the worker to make him or her undesirable as, for example, the combus-
tion of fossil fuels alters the air by producing air pollutants.
A somewhat better metaphor, for which I thank my colleague Mary Anne Case, might
be that of prospectors panning for gold in a stream. Just as the prospector must decide
whether to toss the tailings back into the stream, so also the employer must decide
whether and how to return employees to the general labor pool. I suspect that if property
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A third potential benefit of discharge is that it may produce a
period of occupational incapacitation during which a dangerous or
unproductive employee can do no harm. Some individuals are
undoubtedly so likely to impair productivity in the workplace
that society would be better off if they were to remain unem-
ployed. Discharge thus helps to keep these individuals at least
temporarily out of work. However, as we saw in discussing the
deterrent effects of discharge, asymmetric information about em-
ployee productivity shortens the expected period of unemploy-
ment. Moreover, it seems likely that the number of discharged
workers who could be employed profitably in some job far exceeds
the number of those who are seeking work but nevertheless
should remain permanently unemployed. 4 Even so, the market
process of discharge, reemployment, and repeated discharge may
be the most efficient means of incapacitating this comparatively
small group of totally unproductive individuals."s Our concerns
about employee churning thus should focus on those workers who
unquestionably can produce a marginal product in excess of the
legal minimum wage.
rights to a stretch of stream are well defined, prospectors will separate the tailings from
the stream whenever the expected future benefit of doing so exceeds the cost. In contrast,
employers have no similar claim on a portion of the labor pool. We may therefore expect
them to behave more like prospectors exploiting a common resource. They will maximize
their private returns without regard for the effects that their actions may have on the to-
tal returns that can be obtained from the common pool. Without well defined stakes, pros-
pectors have every incentive to dump their tailings anywhere that they do not themselves
expect to be working. Similarly, employers have an incentive to pass their dead wood
"downstream" to other employers.
' Here it is important to note that only those who are not otherwise incapacitated and
who are seeking work should be considered possible targets for this beneficial incapacita-
tion effect of discharge. Thus, we must exclude from consideration anyone who is either
currently incarcerated or receiving total disability benefits.
'By considering medical testimony and workers' job prospects, administrative
schemes such as Social Security Disability Insurance and worker's compensation evaluate
the fitness for employment of workers who do not wish to work. However, these programs
do not address those who want to work but perhaps should not. Repeated discharge may
be a cost-effective way to identify such employees.
The criminal justice system is an important alternative means of incapacitating cer-
tain dangerous individuals: criminal sentences normally include a period of incarceration,
and a record of certain types of criminal convictions disqualifies the released ex-convict
from some employment opportunities. It is ultimately an empirical question what mix of
criminal incarceration and labor market discharges optimally protects us against harm.
Because the sanction of unemployment is considerably less severe, discharge may well be
a better penalty for chronically negligent and dangerous, but not morally blameworthy,
conduct. But we should also bear in mind that employers have a socially excessive incen-
tive to rely on discharge as a discipline device. See text accompanying note 93. Without
better evidence concerning the social costs and benefits of these alternatives, any policy
prescription rests on little more than speculation.
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The fourth and final constructive role for discharge is as a
labor market signal. Employers who observe that an applicant
has moved frequently among jobs may be able to infer that he is
unproductive. Such signaling is efficient to the extent that it
forces these unproductive individuals into jobs in which their un-
desirable characteristics cause fewer problems. Thus, for exam-
ple, employers hiring for safety-sensitive positions might estab-
lish a policy requiring a record of stable prior employment experi-
ence. Once again, however, incomplete information undermines
these potentially beneficial effects. Employers often are unable to
distinguish among various types of employment termination.
Without this critical information, discharge cannot function effec-
tively as a signal. Moreover, even to the extent that prospective
employers can discover at least the sequence and duration of
prior jobs, frequent job changes are common in early career and
in some occupations and industries." Indeed, without more de-
tailed information about the reason for each job movement, pro-
spective employers might well run the risk of misconstruing the
meaning of the signal. 7
Thus we see that each of the potentially beneficial effects of
discharge on labor market efficiency may be undermined by in-
complete or asymmetric information, and that churning may re-
sult. Unfortunately, there is no natural market mechanism to
eliminate churning. As noted earlier, individual employers bene-
fit from the ability to discharge undesirable employees even
though all employers collectively suffer from the resulting degra-
dation of the quality of the pool of job seekers. However, the pos-
sible signaling function of discharge suggests a strategy by which
employers might try to avoid the ill effects of churning. Employ-
ers could conceivably protect themselves against hiring churned
employees by refusing to hire anyone who has been formerly em-
ployed elsewhere. In essence, they would infer from a change in
jobs that someone is more likely to be an undesirable employee.
Adopting such a strategy essentially creates a closed internal la-
For example, the turnover rate in the health care industry is distinctly higher than
that of the manufacturing sector. The annual turnover rate in the health care industry
during 1994 and 1995 was 15.6 percent, whereas the annual turnover rate in the manu-
facturing sector during the same time period was only 9.6 percent. Turnover rates also
vary with company size. Companies with between 250 and 499 employees experienced the
highest turnover rate in 1994, averaging 13.2 percent, while companies with more than
2,500 employees had only a 9.6 percent turnover rate. BNA's Quarterly Report on Job Ab-
sence and Turnover-4th Quarter 1995, 47 Bulletin to Management BNA Policy and Prac-
tice Series (Mar 14, 1996); BNA's Job Absence and Turnover Report-4th Quarter 1994, 46
Bulletin to Management, BNA Policy and Practice Series 76-77 (Mar 9, 1995).
I analyze this possibility more fully in the next section's discussion of scarring.
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bor market." The available empirical evidence shows that such
firms are exceedingly rare.9 However, many employers undoubt-
edly follow less extreme versions of this signaling strategy. In
certain circumstances, or for some jobs, they rely on signals about
prior employment history to sort prospective employees. Unfortu-
nately, this common strategy creates the potential for scarring,
the third inefficiency resulting from employee turnover.
3. Scarring.
Scarring occurs when employers rely on labor market sig-
nals, such as prior employment history or employment references,
to deny a job to someone who could be profitably employed. Con-
sider again our example of the lecherous science teacher. Suppose
that we know the allegations of sexual misconduct are true and
that rather than providing a misleadingly positive letter of refer-
ence, the school discloses only his job title and dates of service.
Schools to which the teacher applies may react in two general
ways to this situation. First, schools might ignore the lack of a
reference and evaluate the teacher on the basis of other available
evidence such as his academic record, professional certifications,
personal references, and interview performance. Churning is a
likely result. On the other hand, schools might worry that the
lack of a reference is a signal of misconduct. They may therefore
refuse to hire the discharged teacher or any other candidate who
does not have adequate references from all former employers."°°
This use of labor market signals creates the possibility of scar-
ring.
See, for example, Michael L. Wachter and Randall D. Wright, The Economics of In-
ternal Labor Markets, 29 Industrial Relations 240 (1990); George A. Akerlof and Janet L.
Yellen, eds, Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market (Cambridge 1986).
See John Thomas Delaney, David Lewin, and Casey Ichniowski, Human Resource
Policies and Practices in American Firms 12-15 (Dept of Labor 1989). It is impossible for
many employers to maintain ranks of employees who would be available to fill any possi-
ble job opening at higher levels. Smaller employers, for example, often have several dis-
crete groups of workers with no shared skills or natural lines of progression from entry-
level to higher positions. An employer's need for employees at various levels also may fluc-
tuate unpredictably. A closed internal labor market cannot easily adjust to such demand
fluctuations. Finally, filling a higher-level vacancy can cause a cascade of vacancies in
various subordinate positions and therefore require many promotions and transfers to fill
all of the affected positions. Hiring an outsider to fill a position allows an employer to
avoid training and transition costs for the large number of reassignments that purely in-
ternal promotion requires. It is thus fairly easy to understand why the vast majority of
employers are unable to establish completely closed internal labor markets.
"Recall that precisely this fear motivated some legislatures to adopt service letter
statutes around the turn of the century. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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Without the benefit of employment references, prospective
employers cannot distinguish voluntary from involuntary termi-
nations. Moreover, the fact that some of those who voluntarily
terminate their employment may be doing so under the threat of
discharge undermines the potential value of drawing such a dis-
tinction. 0 Employers may respond to this uncertainty by as-
suming that anyone without a reference would have received a
negative one and therefore refusing to hire both those who quit
and those who are discharged. But this rule for disqualifying job
applicants is overinclusive. Indiscriminately denying employment
to all those who have experienced an employment termination
requires employers to shun many potentially productive candi-
dates. A substantial portion of disqualified candidates will have
quit for personal reasons that do not reflect badly on their pro-
ductivity.0 2 Moreover, a number of those discharged for poor per-
formance will have been unsuccessful because of a firm-specific
factor, such as a personality conflict or bad luck, that again im-
plies nothing about their general productivity. A potentially sig-
nificant social cost of incomplete and asymmetric information is,
therefore, the greater difficulty that these individuals may have
finding appropriate employment.
Scarring also can occur when prospective employers receive
negative information from former employers about the reasons
for termination. They may, for example, learn that a job candi-
date was discharged from his last job and receive a statement of
.
01 See, for example, Former Assistant DA Files Suit Over His Firing for Sexual En-
counter, 1996 Daily Labor Rep 141, dli (July 23, 1996) (discussing Lee v City and County
of San Francisco, No C-96-2505 (N D Cal, July 12, 1996), in which an employer told plain-
tiff to resign or be fired); Fuentes v United Parcel Service, 1996 Daily Labor Rep 121, d4
(June 24, 1996) (LEXIS) ("In return for a severance package, [two managers] were allowed
to resign for 'personal reasons' on the condition that they sign releases waiving any em-
ployment discrimination claims arising from the employment terminations."); Stuempges v
Parke, Davis & Co, 297 NW2d 252, 255 (Minn 1980) (Employee was promised a positive
reference in exchange for resigning voluntarily.).
" Indeed, available statistics on employee turnover suggest that the majority of em-
ployment terminations are voluntary quits. See Michael A. Campion, Meaning and Meas-
urement of Turnover: Comparison of Alternative Measures and Recommendations for Re-
search, 76 J Applied Psych 199, 204 (1991). This study found that between 70.2 and 76.3
percent of employee terminations were voluntary. Between 23.6 and 33.5 percent of turn-
over was due to "personal reasons" (attending school, personal factors, moving away,
health). Other leading reasons included: higher wages/career opportunity (between 24.1
and 30.7 percent); lack of promotion (between 1.1 and 6.7 percent); dissatisfaction with
work schedule (between 0.4 and 2.2 percent); dissatisfaction with work conditions (be-
tween 0.4 and 7.6 percent); and dissatisfaction with supervision (between 0.4 and 9.5 per-
cent). See also, Job Absence and Turnover Control, BNA Personnel Policies Forum Survey
No 132, 13-15 (October 1981). It is important, however, to bear in mind the inherent limi-
tations of these self-reported data. We have no independent means of verifying that the
subjects accurately classified their reasons for employment termination.
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reasons for the firing. If the stated reasons cast doubt on the can-
didate's productivity, many prospective employers can be ex-
pected to rely on these signals to deny him a job. But the employ-
ers' decision rule is once again potentially overinclusive. Some-
times the stated reasons for termination will be factually true but
incomplete. Thus, prospective employers may not learn about ad-
ditional exculpatory facts or subjective contextual evidence that
would dispel the inference of low productivity. Sometimes the
stated reasons may be untrue. False reports of misconduct or in-
competence can interfere with the employment prospects of even
highly productive individuals. Although it is rational for employ-
ers to rely on this information, the resulting hiring decisions may
nevertheless leave productive workers unemployed or underem-
ployed.0 3
In an ideal world, of course, prospective employers would be
able to rely on a full and candid disclosure from an applicant's
former employers to decide whether the reasons for a particular
employment termination disqualify him or her from consideration
for a job. The problems of mismatching, churning, and scarring
cannot occur in a full-information equilibrium. We know, how-
ever, that such disclosure rarely occurs.' The question that I
consider in the remainder of this Article is whether there are ef-
fective regulatory solutions to these problems or whether they are
perhaps best left to the natural corrective mechanisms of the
market.
C. Pursuing a Full-Information Equilibrium
I have shown that incomplete and asymmetric information
about employee productivity can cause three labor market ineffi-
ciencies. It is therefore natural to consider whether legal regula-
tion or spontaneous market processes could solve these problems.
Two types of governmental intervention could, in theory, achieve
" The problem of scarring is somewhat similar to statistical discrimination on the ba-
sis of race or gender. See, for example, Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Effi-
cient?, 76 Am Econ Rev 228 (1986); Shelly J. Lundberg and Richard Startz, Private Dis-
crimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 Am Econ Rev 340
(1983); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am Econ Rev
659 (1972). Scarring is undoubtedly inefficient as compared to an equilibrium in which in-
formation is costless, but once we acknowledge that employers must expend real resources
to acquire information about job candidates, the argument for inefficiency is more tenu-
ous. Relying on signals is a time-honored way to economize on information costs. Thus, we
should not conclude that scarring is necessarily inefficient unless we can identify a cost-
effective way to provide better information about applicants or unless employers have a
socially excessive incentive to rely on these labor market signals.
1See notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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first-best efficiency. Under one approach, regulators would im-
pose a disclosure obligation designed to move the labor market
toward an efficient full-information equilibrium. An alternative
approach would involve subsidies and penalties designed to influ-
ence primary conduct such as hiring, firing, and quitting. How-
ever, the inherent complexity of administering these schemes
presents an insurmountable practical barrier to their implemen-
tation. Potential market solutions would encounter significant co-
ordination problems in addition to the problem of verifiability
that makes disclosure regulations ineffective. Thus, I conclude
that a first-best equilibrium is unachievable.
1. Disclosure regulations.
Mismatching, churning, and scarring arise from incomplete
and asymmetric information about productivity. A logical regula-
tory response to these problems therefore would be to require
employers to disclose everything that they know about their for-
mer employees. At least in theory, such a full disclosure obliga-
tion would eliminate the informational asymmetry between for-
mer and prospective employers and could provide more complete
information to be used in hiring and other employment decisions.
As a practical matter, however, such a full disclosure require-
ment would be impossible to administer.
Third party judicial decisionmakers would have to determine
whether or not an employer had made a full and truthful disclo-
sure. However, we have seen that inherently unverifiable subjec-
tive assessments of productivity play a significant role in evalu-
ating employees. °5 Any feasible disclosure rule would have no ef-
fect on the disclosure of this information because it is quite sim-
ply impossible to enforce legal rules that make liability contin-
gent on unverifiable information."6 Moreover, enforcement costs
would be extremely high. Employers and their agents often make
no permanent record of even objectively verifiable facts about
employees. As a result, regulators or aggrieved parties trying to
discover whether a former employer had failed to disclose impor-
tant information would have to depose every supervisory em-
ployee who might have observed something significant. Finally,
the sheer number of regulated transactions would be several or-
See note 69 and accompanying text.
"Compare Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Court: An Analysis of Incom-
plete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271, 280-83 (1992) (explaining
that contract terms based on unobservable or unverifiable terms are unenforceable be-
cause courts adopt a passive approach in such cases rather than base their decisions on
speculation).
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ders of magnitude greater than the number governed by existing
disclosure schemes."°7
Both the difficulty of verifying that disclosure had been made
and the burden of enforcement costs inevitably would make any
real-world disclosure scheme incomplete. 8 Somewhat ironically,
such incomplete disclosure may be worse than none at all. Partial
disclosure of negative information increases the risk of scarring.
Prospective employers who learn some facts about job candidates'
prior misconduct may shun those workers even though they
would have been eligible for hiring if the employers either knew
everything or knew nothing about the misconduct. Thus, for ex-
ample, a manager's subordinate may complain that he demanded
sexual favors in exchange for promotion. But suppose that after
making a subjective assessment of the complainant's credibility,
the employer believes that the complaint is unfounded.0 9 A legal
disclosure requirement could easily induce the employer to dis-
close the objectively verifiable harassment complaint. However,
prospective employers are far less likely to learn about the former
employer's subjective credibility assessment. If employers know
only the unadorned fact that a formal sexual harassment com-
plaint named the manager as an offending party, then he may
have tremendous difficulty finding a comparable new job.
'"For example, the prospectus requirement for newly issued securities involves a sig-
nificantly smaller number of transactions per year. Each year, publicly held companies
make well over ten thousand new security issues (1994: 17,714; 1995: 22,014) (figures de-
rived from LEXIS prospectuses database). In contrast, the average annual number of job
openings filled each year exceeds 20 million. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Projections and Training Data 4 tbl 1 (May 1994).
" The ideal of a full-information equilibrium also requires individually determined
wages. If there are constraints on wage bargains, then even a full-information equilibrium
could leave less desirable workers underemployed. One fairly robust stylized fact about
current labor markets is that wages are most often linked to jobs rather than negotiated
on an individual basis. Workers then compete for the most desirable positions. One conse-
quence of this market structure is that wages tend to be somewhat inflexible within job
categories. Employers presumably set wages at a level equal to the average marginal
product of employees in the category. This wage structure gives employers an incentive to
discharge workers who underperform the level of productivity that employers might hope
to obtain from a new hire. Moreover, if the information available to employers about each
employee's productivity is anything less than complete, then offering or accepting a lower
than normal wage could be a damning signal of low productivity. Because of adverse selec-
tion, such contracts might be impossible to sustain, and the no-contract equilibrium could
prevail. Compare Rothschild and Stiglitz, 90 Q J Econ 629, 629 (cited in note 72). Finally,
even to the extent that it is possible to control the flow of information available to prospec-
tive employers, firms would still be free to use their private information in inefficient
ways. Firms would make discharge decisions based in part on unverifiable subjective as-
sessments of productivity. It might often be the case, however, that such discharges would
produce churning.
'"The employer may have noted internal inconsistencies in the complainant's story or
may be aware of a history of filing unfounded harassment complaints.
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2. Behavioral regulations.
Rather than trying to control the flow of information about
former employees, regulators could instead design rules that
would influence primary conduct such as hiring, firing, and quit-
ting. Existing doctrines such as respondeat superior and the torts
of negligent hiring and negligent retention take this approach.
Employers are strictly liable for employee torts committed within
the scope of employment; in addition, they face negligence liabil-
ity for their employees' misdeeds whenever they could have taken
cost-effective precautions to prevent harm."° This liability expo-
sure theoretically forces employers to make efficient decisions
about hiring, assigning, and retaining employees who may cause
harm to others.
As my analysis of churning demonstrated, however, employ-
ers have socially excessive incentives to discharge undesirable
workers."' Courts determined to prevent inefficient churning
would have to supplement existing law with additional causes of
action."' First, an employer would have to be held liable for "neg-
ligent discharge" whenever churning occurred. Similarly, workers
would have to be liable for "negligent quitting" whenever they
voluntarily terminated their employment in order to move ineffi-
ciently between two jobs.
A moment's reflection on the complex considerations that de-
termine whether turnover inefficiently churns employees or in-
stead promotes socially beneficial matching, deterrence, incapaci-
tation, or signaling should make it obvious that no administrable
legal rule could consistently draw the necessary distinctions."'
Moreover, adequate disclosure by the former employer might
sometimes prevent churning. Thus, a negligent discharge tort
would require courts to assess the accuracy and completeness of
any information that the discharging employer provided to pro-
spective employers. All of the administrative difficulties that af-
flict disclosure regulations thus apply with equal force to the be-
110I reviewed these doctrines at length in an earlier work. See J. Hoult Verkerke, No-
tice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 Va L Rev 273 (1995).
.See text accompanying note 93.
"Another less plausible alternative would be to develop a centrally managed system
of assigning workers to jobs. Although this approach is used by private employers in some
corners of the labor market, see for example, Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor
Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J Pol Econ
991, 996-97 (1984) (discussing medical intern assignment program), its usefulness as a
model for the labor market as a whole seems quite doubtful.
"'See Section ll.B.2. It would be especially difficult to determine who should be liable
when employers and workers conceal disciplinary discharges as voluntary terminations.
See note 101.
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havioral alternative. Finally, the negligent quitting tort would
somehow have to take account of worker preferences. Subjective
and idiosyncratic reactions to different workplaces could quite
easily make one of two ostensibly identical jobs far more desirable
than the other. Workers thus might always attempt to avoid i-
ability by representing that some intangible personal factor
makes the new job a much better match than the prior one. We
may fairly conclude that behavioral regulations are no more
likely than disclosure obligations to achieve first-best efficiency.
3. Market solutions.
Although one might hope that market actors seeking profit-
able business opportunities will develop market mechanisms for
providing an optimal supply of reference information, several
problems make that happy outcome exceedingly unlikely. First,
employers themselves-or informational intermediaries acting on
their behalf-face the difficult problem of making a market for in-
formation. They must define the allocation of liability risks
among the parties, determine how to value each unit of informa-
tion, and develop methods for disseminating the information. In
addition, they face the general problem of innovating in an uncer-
tain legal environment. Potential reference entrepreneurs might
well have to develop new contractual terms to govern their rela-
tionship with both the suppliers and the ultimate consumers of
reference information."4 The fact that many contractual innova-
tions exhibit the characteristics of a public good diminishes
somewhat the incentive to invest heavily to overcome these barri-
ers.
But, of course, the genius of the free-market system is that it
often creates significant rewards for the first company to solve
these problems. Assuming that some intrepid entrepreneur ulti-
mately could overcome these obstacles, she then would confront
exactly the same problem of verifiability that bedevils any at-
tempt to establish comprehensive disclosure regulations. Market
actors cannot contract on the basis of unverifiable information
any more than regulators can compel its disclosure. Thus, even if
market participants are able to overcome coordination problems,
the inherently unverifiable character of much significant infor-
mation will prevent the market from attaining a full-information
... I explore below a variety of specific forms such contracting might take. See Section
Ill.D. For our present purposes, it suffices to show that the market is no more likely than
disclosure regulations to produce a first-best efficient equilibrium.
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equilibrium. Hence market mechanisms, like government inter-
vention, will be unable to attain first-best efficiency."'
This Section has shown that neither informational nor be-
havioral regulations have any realistic prospect of achieving first-
best efficiency. Inevitably incomplete and prohibitively costly to
enforce, comprehensive disclosure requirements are doomed to
failure. Any attempt to design tort rules to provide efficient in-
centives for employee turnover seems no more likely to succeed.
Finally, market efforts to exchange information confront difficult
coordination problems in addition to the problem of verifiability
that constrains the effectiveness of disclosure regulations.
III. REGULATING EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE PRACTICES
We have observed the theoretical difficulties of designing le-
gal rules to combat mismatching, churning, and scarring. In this
Section, I apply these insights to better understand why the
regulatory response to the problems of employment references
has been so modest. The framework I have developed provides a
positive explanation for this regulatory reticence. In addition, by
identifying the most severe losses resulting from inadequate ref-
erence information, the framework indicates which types of lim-
ited legal reforms have the greatest chance of improving labor
market efficiency. However, other significant social values limit
the political feasibility of some of these potentially efficiency-
enhancing measures.
A. Falsely Negative References and the Persistence of
Defamation Liability
By far the most prominent and pervasive form of legal regu-
lation affecting employment reference practices is defamation
law. In every American jurisdiction, the tort of defamation im-
poses liability on employers who provide falsely negative refer-
ences."' This uniformity surely arises in part out of sympathy for
the victims of defamatory references. A single bad reference often
is enough to prevent someone from getting a job for which he is
otherwise qualified."' Thus, falsely negative reference informa-
"'This conclusion is undoubtedly no surprise to students of the literature on the eco-
nomics of information. See, for example, Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, On
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am Econ Rev 393, 404 (1980)
(demonstrating that the price system informs market participants only imperfectly about
the fundamental values of securities, thus leaving some returns to arbitrageurs who in-
vest in discovering nonpublic information).16 See notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
"
7 See, for example, Anderson v Vanden Dorpel, 268 Ill App 3d 907, 645 NE2d 250, 253
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tion not only imposes a significant loss on individual workers; it
also causes the labor market inefficiency that I have called scar-
ring.1
But in order to understand the remarkably uniform legal re-
sponse to this problem, we also must consider what causes em-
ployers to provide falsely negative references. Although employ-
ers themselves may sometimes have a malicious desire to sabo-
tage a former employee's career, defamatory references more
commonly occur when one of an employer's supervisory agents
develops a dislike for a particular employee."' In this classic
agency problem, the supervisor's desire to satisfy a malicious mo-
tive conflicts directly with the employer's interest in treating both
current and former employees fairly. But if straightforward
agency costs produce most defamatory references, it is fair to ask
whether the problem requires legal regulation at all.
The answer to this question lies in a close examination of
employers' incentives to control their agents. It is only former
employees and their prospective employers who experience any
direct harm from inaccurate references. In the absence of legal
regulation, one thus might expect employers to take very few pre-
cautions to ensure the accuracy of the reference information that
they provide. But even without defamation liability, two market
mechanisms could theoretically provide the necessary incentives.
First, an employer might develop a reputation among employers
for providing falsely negative information. Such a reputation pre-
sumably would lead other employers to ignore negative refer-
ences received from that employer. But this hypothetical sanction
creates at most a trivial incentive for taking precautions against
false references because employers generally do not care whether
other employers pay attention to the references that they pro-
vide. 2° Moreover, no obvious mechanism exists for disseminating
the information that would establish an employer's reputation for
providing falsely negative references. Employers typically do not
(1994), revd, 172 111 2d 399, 667 NE2d 1296 (1996) (Prospective employer was enthusiastic
and supportive until it received a negative reference from defendant, at which point it de-
cided not to hire plaintiff.); Sigal Construction Corp v Stanbury, 586 A2d 1204, 1207 (DC
1991) (Plaintiff was offered ajob subject to approval by the owner of a project who received
an unfavorable reference concerning plaintiff and refused to approve his hiring.).
"'See Section II.B.3.
... See, for example, Pavilon v Kaferly, 204 I1 App 3d 235, 149 11 Dec 549, 561 NE2d
1245, 1247 (1990) (Plaintiff was discharged and allegedly defamed after she ended a ro-
mantic relationship with her supervisor.).
' But see Paetzold and Willborn, 30 Am Bus L J 123, 126 (cited in note 19) (offering
creative arguments for why employers should care; but acknowledging that employers
presently seem not to see much value in providing accurate references).
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share with other employers information about the accuracy of
references that they receive.'' Few prospective employers seek
references repeatedly from the same past employers. Even more
tellingly, employers often simply refuse to hire job candidates
who receive a negative reference. Thus, they never have an op-
portunity to learn whether the negative reference is false.
Nevertheless, a second market mechanism could theoreti-
cally encourage accurate references. An employer might develop a
reputation among workers for falsely condemning former employ-
ees. Such a reputation might, like bad working conditions or arbi-
trary discipline, require the employer to pay a compensating
wage differential to attract and retain qualified workers. This
higher wage cost would provide a powerful incentive for the em-
ployer to take precautions against providing falsely negative ref-
erences. But workers are even less likely than prospective em-
ployers to be able to determine whether any particular employer
deserves such a reputation. Employment references are provided
in confidence to employers, and they ordinarily concern former
employees. Thus, neither current nor prospective employees can
realistically hope to learn whether or not an employer provides
accurate references. 2 Without this information, a reputation
among workers simply cannot form.
The ineffectiveness of reputation as an incentive device, and
the absence of any other plausible market check, suggests that at
the least courts should impose liability on employers for provid-
ing falsely negative references and require an express waiver to
overcome this presumptive assignment of liability." Under such
12' Employers have a proprietary interest in the information they have gathered, and
such disclosure carries with it some risk of legal liability for excessive publication or for
defaming the referring employer. One exception to the general rule of nondisclosure is the
occasional discussion concerning reference accuracy in the community of legal academics.
Some providers of academic references have become notorious for offering glowing recom-
mendations in support of even rather mediocre candidates. Such empty praise is routinely
discounted. Perhaps because negative recommendations are comparatively rare, I am
aware of no similar example in which a community of employers discounts negative in-
formation.
Indeed, the only plausible source of such information would be complaints from for-
mer employees who thought that they had been falsely condemned in a reference. The
sporadic nature of such complaints, coupled with a lack of first-hand information about
the content of the reference, makes me profoundly skeptical that complaints are a realistic
basis for forming the necessary reputation.
'Although a contractual default rule assigning this risk to the employer might
achieve roughly the same purpose, traditional limitations on contract damages, including
certainty and foreseeability, would make the expected recovery undercompensatory. Tort
damages are somewhat more generous and protect more completely the employee's pro-
prietary interest in his reputation. In the text, I also explain why courts might be skepti-
cal that contractual terms varying this assignment of liability were the product of an effi-
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a rule, employees could agree prospectively to waive their right to
recover for defamatory references. However, the same barriers to
obtaining information about employers' reference practices that
prevent reputation from functioning as an effective incentive de-
vice also cast doubt on the wisdom of permitting parties to con-
tract out of liability for providing falsely negative references.
Employees have no access to reliable information about reference
practices and therefore cannot assess the risk of defamatory ref-
erences. Because of this informational asymmetry, employers
might demand and employees might agree to a prospective
waiver of defamation liability. Employers thus could externalize
the costs of falsely negative references. Without defamation li-
ability, former employees and prospective employers bear the
burden for such references.' As a result, we should expect em-
ployers who demand and receive a prospective waiver to take in-
efficiently few precautions against providing falsely negative ref-
erences. Labor market efficiency thus provides a justification for
imposing non-waivable liability in these circumstances.'25
The analysis in this Section has shown that falsely negative
references produce an externality that burdens former employees
and causes scarring. Because the labor market cannot easily
transmit information about employers' reference practices--ei-
ther among other employers or among workers-defamation law
is a logical regulatory response to this externality. This analysis
thus provides a positive explanation for the prominence and per-
cient bargaining process.
'It may be instructive to compare reference practices to the terms governing dis-
charge under indefinite term employment contracts. Because an arbitrary and unjust dis-
charge costs the employer a productive employee and often harms internal morale, em-
ployers have substantial incentives to control their supervisory agents. See J. Hoult Verk-
erke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the
Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis L Rev 837 (offering both empirical and theoretical argu-
ments in support of the prevailing default rule of employment at will). In contrast, falsely
negative references affect only former employees and prospective employers. I also have
shown that no effective reputational or other market checks force employers to take care
against providing inaccurate references. In particular, employees are far more likely to
know the circumstances surrounding a coworkers discharge than they will be to know
whether their employer is making defamatory statements about former employees. This
lack of extralegal incentives provides both a positive explanation and a normative justifi-
cation for adopting a more aggressive regulatory approach to defamation and employment
references than to indefinite term employment contracts.
"A student commentator has suggested permitting parties to contract within certain
limits for modifications of the liability standard for defamation. See Horkan, Note, 79 Va L
Rev at 526 (cited in note 3). The limits he suggests are generally compatible with my
analysis and leave the employer facing some significant threat of liability. Id at 520, 547.
Horkan rejects the possibility of allowing employees to execute a complete waiver of defa-
mation liability. Id at 547. For additional discussion of these and other contractual de-
vices, see Section mI.D.
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sistence of the tort of defamation.' It also offers a normative
reason to resist any proposals to eviscerate defamation liability."7
B. Activity-Level Problems and Possible Solutions
1. The role of the common interest privilege.
Although we have seen that defamation law is necessary, an
unwelcome side effect of imposing liability for falsely negative
references is a reduction in the total quantity of references pro-
vided. The deterrent effects of liability thus improve reference
quality, but at the expense of a lower activity level.' In other ar-
eas of tort law, courts have imposed strict liability precisely to
produce such decreases in activity level."9 In regulating employ-
ment reference practices, however, lawmakers appear to believe
that providing reference information is a socially valuable activ-
"As I have already observed, an action for defamatory references is available in every
American jurisdiction. No other feature of employment reference regulation enjoys such
uniform acceptance.
'Some of the more vigorous critics of defamation law impliedly suggest eliminating
its application to employment reference practices except in cases of knowing falsity. See,
for example, Reed and Henkel, 26 Am Bus L J at 323 (cited in note 3); Brian McCall, Em-
ployers Need To Know Job Histories, Dallas Morning News 13A (Nov 13, 1995). Other
critics have made more modest proposals to clarify existing law. See, for example, Saxton,
13 Yale L & Policy Rev at 113 (cited in note 1) (proposing that the malice standard be dis-
continued and defamation liability be found for: (1) knowing or reckless falsity; (2) false
publication beyond the privilege; or (3) disclosure of defamatory matter not reasonably
related to the purpose of the privilege). Such doctrinal clarification could well help defa-
mation law to perform its deterrent function more effectively. Reducing uncertainty tends
to reduce enforcement costs and to facilitate the efficient negotiation and settlement of le-
gal disputes. But there is little reason to believe that clarification would produce a signifi-
cant increase in employers' willingness to share information.
I am also skeptical that any doctrinal innovation can substantially lessen the factual
uncertainty at the heart of defamation law. The truth or falsity of the challenged state-
ment and the employer's level of fault will always be contested issues of fact. Neverthe-
less, defamation doctrine is admittedly more ossified and arcane than many other areas of
tort law. Doctrinal clarification might reduce uncertainty about liability and thus reduce
somewhat the disincentive to providing candid references. Recent codifications of the con-
ditional privilege can be understood as legislative efforts to encourage courts to clarify the
contours of the privilege as it applies to employment references. See notes 60-62 and ac-
companying text.
'This conclusion is a commonplace observation in the economic analysis of tort law.
See, for example, Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 21-32 (Harvard
1990).
'George Priest has recounted the influence of this activity-level rationale on modern
tort law. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J Legal Stud 461 (1985).
Steven Croley and Jon Hanson are presently the most ardent academic advocates of the
activity-level analysis of strict products liability. See Steven P. Croley and Jon D. Hanson,
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich L Rev 683,
797 (1993).
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ity that should not be unduly discouraged.' Accordingly, existing
law incorporates the conditional "common interest" privilege. The
conditional -privilege raises the standard of proof for defamation
plaintiffs when they challenge statements, such as employment
references, that are made between parties who have a common
interest in knowing the information.'' In theory at least, this
partial protection from suit encourages employers to provide in-
formation in precisely those circumstances where it is most valu-
able. ' 2 Those who make falsely negative statements outside of
these specially valuable circumstances must defend any resulting
defamation claims on less favorable legal ground.
At this point, however, a legal economist might well ask why
we should not simply impose strict liability for defamatory state-
ments and rely on the market to determine the optimal quantity
of information to be provided.' Two factors militate against this
approach. First, although in theory the choice between strict li-
ability and negligence has no effect on precautions, it will ordi-
narily affect activity levels.3 It is plausible to assume that im-
posing strict defamation liability on employers would lead them
to provide fewer references than they would provide if negligence
or some other more protective fault standard applied.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, markets for informa-
tion are generally somewhat fragile.3 5 The market for reference
information, in particular, must confront a number of difficulties
such as establishing the value of each reference, collecting and
disseminating references in a timely fashion, verifying the accu-
racy of the provided information, and finally determining the al-
location of legal liability associated with sharing reference infor-
mation. Whether or not market participants can surmount such
" See note 60 and accompanying text.
... See notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
'"The common interest privilege confers special protection on statements when a suf-
ficiently substantial social interest in the free flow of information is at stake. Although it
is an admittedly crude distinction, the limited application of the privilege is entirely con-
sistent with the quantity-quality trade-off. Increasing the quantity of references provided
is most likely to be worth the cost of more falsely negative references (a decline in quality)
in those situations singled out by the common interest doctrine. The quest for a common
interest identifies those situations in which the challenged statement has a social value
beyond the intrinsic pleasure of communication. It is this added social value that justifies
conferring special legal protection on privileged statements.
'"Indeed, at the time of Blackstone, defamation was a strict liability tort. After a pe-
riod of evolution, however, a fault requirement has become firmly established in defama-
tion doctrine. For a detailed historical discussion of defamation law, see Lewis, Ottley, and
Mersol, 54 Mo L Rev at 802-09 (cited in note 3).
"See note 128.
'See Section llI.D (discussing a variety of barriers to creating a market for reference
information).
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problems, the existence of these barriers to a thriving market for
references helps to explain why a lawmaker might be inclined to
reject strict liability for defamation in favor of an approach that
relies less heavily on market incentives to ensure an adequate
supply of reference information.
The unavoidable trade-off between the quantity and quality
of information thus has led courts, and an increasing number of
state legislatures, to give employers who provide references the
protection of a conditional privilege."6 But if a little bit of privi-
lege is good, one might ask, why not provide more? Lawmakers
could presumably generate an even greater quantity of references
by conferring on employers an absolute privilege similar to the
protection afforded statements made in judicial proceedings.' An
absolute privilege, however, would be ill-advised for essentially
the same reason that defamation law has remained prominent in
the legal regulation of employment reference practices. Defama-
tion liability deters employers from ignoring the costs they im-
pose on former employees when they provide falsely negative ref-
erence information.
Moreover, the doctrinal rule conferring an absolute privilege
for judicial testimony cleverly selects a situation in which alter-
native constraints on quality provide an adequate substitute for
defamation liability. Someone who testifies falsely faces an (ad-
mittedly remote) possibility of perjury prosecution. More signifi-
cantly, testimony is offered in an adversarial setting. The oppos-
ing party typically has both an ample opportunity and a substan-
tial interest in refuting any false statement, even if only to im-
peach the credibility of a hostile witness. 8' Finally, most state-
ments in litigation reach a restricted audience of individuals-the
judge, jury, lawyers, and the litigants themselves-who, outside
of the litigation outcome, have no particular control over the
subject's future. In contrast, prospective employers determine
"As I explained earlier, the legislative efforts appear to do little more than codify the
preexisting common law conditional privilege. It remains to be seen whether these legisla-
tive "good faith" privileges will be more protective than the common law variety. See notes
60-62 and accompanying text.
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 587-88 (granting an absolute privilege for par-
ties and witnesses to judicial proceedings). Several states have extended the absolute
privilege to administrative proceedings. See, for example, Blote v First Federal Savings &
Loan Association of Rapid City, 422 NW2d 834, 838 (SD 1988).
"The Fair Credit Reporting Act's procedures for correcting inaccuracies in investiga-
tive consumer reports similarly might provide a check on the accuracy of employment ref-
erence information contained in those reports. 15 USC §§ 1681 et seq (1994). The need for
defamation liability is reduced precisely to the extent that independent mechanisms for
ensuring accuracy are effective. I discuss this possible role of FCRA-like procedures below.
See Section III.D.
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whether a person will be gainfully employed or instead remain
unemployed. Employment references thus differ significantly
from judicial testimony in ways that make an expansion of the
absolute privilege exceedingly unlikely."9
Although strong arguments support lawmakers' consistent
rejection of the extremes of strict liability and absolute privilege,
determining the proper intermediate level for the privilege de-
pends on assessing the likely effects of different levels of protec-
tion. Because of empirical uncertainty about these effects, it is
possible that anything from a negligence standard to a rule re-
quiring proof of actual malice could be the optimal legal standard
that properly balances the quantity and quality of reference in-
formation. This uncertainty explains the variety of standards we
observe. 4 ' Without concrete empirical evidence, however, law-
makers should be skeptical of reform proposals that would shift
the quantum of proof required to show an abuse of the conditional
privilege. Both anecdotal accounts and survey evidence demon-
strate that employers presently provide a substantial amount of
information about former employees.' And yet complaints about
an inadequate supply of certain types of reference information
persist. The conditional privilege undoubtedly encourages some
employers to provide references. But no available evidence shows
that substantially increasing or decreasing the burden of proof on
defamation plaintiffs would generate a better balance between
the quantity and quality of reference information available to
prospective employers. Thus, although the optimal degree of pro-
tection is uncertain, the central role of the conditional privilege in
defamation law appears secure.
"Another possible explanation for the absolute privilege in judicial proceedings is
that witnesses can be compelled to testify against their will. On this theory, it would be
unfair to expose someone to defamation liability for making negative statements under
the threat of a contempt sanction. In my view, this explanation fails because it also would
predict that such witnesses would be made immune from peijury prosecution. The fact
that no immunity protects them from criminal liability for false statements suggests that
the compulsion cannot explain witnesses' absolute immunity from civil liability for those
same false statements.
"'See Horkan, Note, 79 Va L Rev at 523-26 (cited in note 3) (discussing jurisdictional
variations in standards for abuse of the privilege).
"' For example, one recent survey found that for nine out of eleven categories of infor-
mation, less than half of employers reported that they received an "inadequate" amount of
information from employment references. See SHRM Survey (cited in note 2). No empiri-
cal work is available to demonstrate that strict liability would not produce the same quan-
tity of information. But employers' lobbying efforts in favor of bills that would codify, or
strengthen slightly, the conditional privilege supports the belief that such protections in-
fluence their behavior.
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2. Disclosure obligations: an ineffectual solution to the
activity-level problem.
Nevertheless, an extensive literature asserts that, despite
the conditional privilege, defamation law deters employers from
providing an adequate quantity of references." A direct regula-
tory strategy for overcoming this activity-level problem would be
to mandate disclosure. Although we already have seen that a full-
information equilibrium is unattainable, 4 3 even a limited disclo-
sure obligation might force former employers to be more forth-
coming. Unfortunately, the potential benefits of a disclosure obli-
gation are outweighed by the difficulty of enforcement, the costs
associated with partial disclosure, and the possibility of strategi-
cally motivated litigation.
As I have observed already, no enforceable legal rule can
compel employers to disclose unverifiable subjective assessments
of employee productivity. 4 Employers might even adapt to a dis-
closure obligation by making more observations of employees
practically unverifiable in order to avoid potential liability. They
might, for example, prepare and retain fewer documentary rec-
ords of employee misconduct. The practical value of a disclosure
duty thus is strictly limited by these enforcement difficulties.
Moreover, I have noted that partial disclosure can be worse than
no disclosure at all.145 Employers can be compelled to disclose
verifiable facts-a sexual harassment complaint or an accident-
but not subjective assessments of responsibility and credibility.
Even innocent employees could be scarred and thus condemned to
chronic unemployment or underemployment by such incomplete
disclosures.
A final difficulty with disclosure obligations is that they cre-
ate opportunities for wasteful strategic litigation. Whenever an
employee engages in serious misconduct, his former employers
could be dragged into a legal battle over who is responsible. A
cause of action for failure to disclose would encourage plaintiffs to
investigate each and every prior employer of the tortfeasor for
any evidence that those former employers had notice of the in-
jurer's dangerous proclivities. A modest increase in the available
quantity of information may not be worth the additional cost and
complexity of deciding whether the former employer in fact had
notice of the employee's propensity to engage in misconduct. Un-
.. See note 2.
"s See Section II.C.
" See Section II.C.1.
"See Section lI.B.3.
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less the scope of the duty to disclose is unmistakably clear and
unambiguous, former employers could well be forced either to de-
fend the reasonableness of their disclosure decisions or to pay set-
tlements to avoid the cost of litigation. Given the potentially
amorphous quality of information about risks, the opportunity for
exploitative strike suits is substantial. These considerations help
to explain why lawmakers generally have chosen not to impose
such disclosure obligations on employers.'46
3. Special considerations for high-risk occupations.
Although generally applicable disclosure obligations seem
unpromising, the analysis of the relationship between churning
and severe mismatching shows that increasing the quantity of
available information about the reasons for discharge would be
especially valuable to employers hiring workers for high-risk oc-
cupations. A more targeted regulatory approach might therefore
mandate specific, verifiable disclosure and reporting obligations
for such occupations. Thus, for example, drug and alcohol test re-
cords for truck drivers, train engineers, and pilots might be made
available to all prospective employers. The necessary reporting
obligations could conceivably be incorporated into the existing li-
censing and health certification procedures that exist for these
occupations. 47 Similarly, employers of school teachers might be
required to report complaints of inappropriate behavior to the
public agency that issues teaching certifications.
As we have seen, however, a countervailing risk of disclosure
obligations is an increase in the incidence of scarring.4 ' To be
sure, in these high-risk contexts we should be willing to tolerate
adverse decisions made on the basis of less certain information
about a worker's propensity to commit harm than we would re-
quire in normal-risk employment.' However, even targeted dis-
closure obligations could create a risk of wasteful, strategically
motivated litigation.50 Only by relying exclusively on administra-
tive enforcement mechanisms could regulators avoid this risk.5'
'"My review of state law suggests that only three states have service letter statutes
backed by a significant enforcement mechanism. See note 33. Even in these states, I am
aware of no study systematically assessing the effectiveness of these disclosure obliga-
tions.
"7 See, for example, 14 CFR §§ 61.1-67.31 (1997) (establishing requirements for certifi-
cation of ffight crew members for proficiency and health).
"See Section H.C.1.
"See Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Ad-
verse Decisions, 25 J Legal Stud 27, 31 (1996).
"' See note 146 and accompanying text.
.51For this reason, we might expect to see expanded reporting obligations first in in-
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Perhaps a more significant constraint on imposing reporting
and disclosure regulations is the uniquely powerful fear that
most Americans have of centralized data gathering.152 This vis-
ceral reaction against the machinations of Big Brother and his
private siblings is an important political obstacle to the adoption
of any reporting scheme. These political constraints coupled with
the risk of scarring suggest that only quite narrow reporting obli-
gations are likely to be imposed.
Given these barriers to the adoption of a comprehensive re-
porting and disclosure scheme for high-risk occupations, we
should consider alternative policies. Existing law relies heavily
on negligence rules to impose duties of prehiring investigation,
thorough training and supervision, and prompt response to sig-
nals of trouble. Reform-minded judges could strengthen these du-
ties, requiring high-risk employers to undertake all cost-effective
means of inducing former employers to reveal information about
job candidates.153 This approach diminishes the risk of strategic
litigation because only the employer responsible for hiring and
supervising the employee-tortfeasor would face potential liabil-
ity." Moreover, an especially stringent formulation of the duty to
investigate might encourage employers to develop innovative
market-based solutions to the informational problem. I consider
below whether other complementary legal reforms could facilitate
the development of these market mechanisms.
As we have seen, many commentators lament the fact that
the threat of defamation liability deters not only falsely negative
references but also valuable truthful references. They propose a
variety of reforms to deal with this problem.'55 The framework
shows how complex interactions in the labor market make an as-
sessment of such proposals exceptionally difficult. In short, there
dustries such as transportation where existing licensing procedures provide a ready ad-
ministrative enforcement mechanism.
2For an often fascinating exploration of the role of privacy and the uses of informa-
tion in modem technological society, see Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Politi-
cal Economy of Personal Information ch 5-6 (Westview 1993).
"5These duties could also require employers to seek information from public agencies
or even private informational intermediaries whenever the nature of the job warranted
those additional inquiries.
" Under present law, a vicarious liability action almost always will lie against the
employer of a worker who commits a tort related in any way to his or her employment.
Such a regime in which there is but one potential defendant for each employee tort con-
trasts sharply with a mandatory disclosure regime under which all prior employers also
face the possibility of a lawsuit for failing to disclose information about the employee's
dangerous proclivities. See note 146 and accompanying text.
'See sources cited in note 3. A number of commentators also propose clarifying ex-
isting defamation law, to which I have no real objection, but I doubt that such clarification
will change employers' behavior significantly.
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is no a priori basis on which to assess whether the gains from
more information sharing would outweigh the costs of a greater
number of falsely negative references and the potentially harmful
effects of partial disclosure. Nevertheless, the analysis of mis-
matching and churning demonstrates that lawmakers are most
likely to create new disclosure obligations for high-risk occupa-
tions. Such efforts to prevent severe mismatching would be espe-
cially valuable. But if the necessary data-gathering so offends
privacy norms that it is politically infeasible, then stringent neg-
ligent hiring liability might be sufficient to encourage high-risk
employers to use creative means of uncovering the necessary in-
formation.
C. Falsely Positive References and the Shortcomings of
Wrongful Referral Liability
As we have seen, activity-level problems are one unwelcome
side effect of defamation liability. However, the focus of defama-
tion law on negative references also encourages employers to pro-
vide positive references, sometimes even falsely positive refer-
ences. This Section considers whether firms should be held liable
for wrongful referral when they materially misrepresent a former
employee's productivity.
Although the fear of defamation liability may often deter
them from providing any references at all, employers are essen-
tially immune from suit if they provide only positive references.'56
From a manager's perspective, a requirement that all references
be positive is more difficult to administer than a clear but crude
policy that strictly limits reference disclosures to job title and
dates of service. After all, the more restrictive policy relieves
managers from the onerous duty of monitoring all communica-
tions to ensure that no negative remarks find their way into oth-
erwise innocuous references. Nevertheless, a positive reference
strategy is among the set of plausible employer responses to the
"In theory, an employer that provided only positive references might be held liable
for defamation whenever it chose to remain silent about a former employee. The employee
would argue that prospective employers had inferred from the absence of a reference that
her performance was inadequate. Courts have occasionally found such silence actionable
when a discharge occurred in particularly incriminating circumstances. See Berg v Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc, 280 Pa Super 495, 421 A2d 831, 835 (1980) (affirming judg-
ment in slander suit for employee fired in the midst of a criminal investigation of work-
place theft); Tyler v Macks Stores of South Carolina, 275 SC 456, 272 SE2d 633, 634
(1980) (finding that the trial court correctly denied demurrer on a defamation claim made
by a former employee fired after a polygraph test). My research has, however, uncovered
no case in which plaintiffs claim rested solely on a selective positive reference policy.
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threat of defamation liability.'57 Moreover, the analysis of churn-
ing demonstrates that employers sometimes have an affirmative
incentive to provide falsely positive references in order to unload
undesirable employees on the labor market. 5 ' In addition, the po-
tential liability to discharged employees under various statutory
and common law theories of wrongful discharge sometimes leads
employers to agree to provide an undeserved positive reference in
exchange for the employee's voluntary resignation.'59 Finally, re-
employment terminates an employer's liability for unemployment
compensation and provides a pecuniary reason for firms to help
their former employees secure new positions. There is thus an
ample incentive to provide positive references.
Moreover, as my analysis of the problem of falsely negative
references demonstrated, there is no effective market check on
providing inaccurate reference information. 6 ° Indeed, falsely
positive references burden only prospective employers. Former
employees themselves undoubtedly welcome the chance to rely on
false praise. As a result, one of the two possible reputational,
checks on providing false information cannot possibly deter
falsely positive references.'' In fact, an employer might even de-
velop a favorable reputation among employees for routinely giv-
ing positive evaluations. This skewed incentive structure thus
seems likely to produce a significant number of falsely positive
references.
Surprisingly modest extensions of existing legal theories
would be sufficient to hold employers liable for the consequences
of providing falsely positive references. First, the regulatory prin-
ciple underlying defamation law is that employers must be de-
terred from providing false reference information that harms
former employees. This basic principle could quite readily be ex-
tended to include falsely positive information that causes pro-
'Indeed, the SHRM Survey results suggest that many employers may have adopted
this approach. SHRM Survey (cited in note 2) (finding that disclosure is seemingly more
likely for positive or neutral information than for unambiguously negative information
such as "violent/bizarre behavior").
"See Section H.B.2.
"See note 101. A study of patterns in discrimination litigation also suggests that the
risk of discrimination suits is greatest when discharged employees remain unemployed for
a longer period of time. See John J. Donohue, III and Peter Siegelman, Law and Macro-
economics: Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S Cal L Rev
709, 722 (1993). Employers seeking to avoid litigation thus would find it in their interest
to help such former employees find new jobs.
'"See Section DIA.
161 See notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing how the possibility of develop-
ing a reputation among workers for providing falsely negative references could provide an
incentive to take precautions to ensure the accuracy of references).
[65:115
Employment Reference Practices
spective employers and third parties to suffer injury as a result of
severe mismatching. Second, the contract doctrine of misrepre-
sentation recognizes the inefficiency that results when one party
exploits its informational advantage to deceive another party
about the desirability of an exchange transaction.'62 The recipient
of a falsely positive reference often will be induced to form a con-
tract with a job applicant in reliance on the accuracy of the refer-
ence. Admittedly, the reference ordinarily comes from one who
has no contractual relationship with the recipient, but the poten-
tial for inefficiency is every bit as great as when the misrepresen-
tation comes directly from a contractual partner. Finally, the tort
of fraudulent inducement is stated in sufficiently broad doctrinal
terms that it readily could be extended to cover falsely positive
references." A court would have to find only that the relation-
ship between a former employer and the recipient of an employ-
ment reference was sufficiently special to warrant imposing a
duty of accuracy on the former employer."'
Despite these convenient doctrinal precedents for wrongful
referral liability, few courts have even considered the theory, and
there has been no rush to embrace it legislatively. Although law-
makers' lack of interest may seem somewhat puzzling, a variety
of practical problems make this theoretically plausible doctrinal
innovation unlikely to occur. First, wrongful referral liability has
the potential to shut off the flow of reference information com-
pletely. The danger of excessively deterring truthful reference-
giving is particularly acute because an employer can avoid poten-
tial liability only by providing no references whatsoever or by dis-
closing only such limited information that no suit can possibly
arise for wrongful referral.'65 While defamation law undoubtedly
deters some employers from providing even truthfully negative
references, an action for wrongful referral also might prevent
"See note 36 and accompanying text.
"See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537 ("The recipient of a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation can recover against its maker for pecuniary loss resulting from it if, but only if,
(a) he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action, and (b) his reli-
ance is justifiable."). Nondisclosure or partial disclosure is similarly actionable in some
circumstances. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551. See also Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 310-11 (Intentional and negligent misrepresentations are actionable in cases in
which reliance on the misrepresentations results in physical harm.).
" 'The few courts to have considered this theory are sharply divided. See notes 37-38
and accompanying text. Compare Tarasoff, 551 P2d at 348 (holding that psychotherapist
whose patient presents serious danger of violence to another has a duty to use reasonable
care to protect intended victim by steps that may include warning of the threat).
"A common strategy is to disclose only a former employee's job title and dates of
service. See note 65 and accompanying text. The odds of misrepresenting this information
are presumably quite low.
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employers from signaling their level of satisfaction with former
employees by providing positive references with different degrees
of enthusiasm. 16  Prospective employers use this signal to identify
unusually good candidates even though it is considerably more
difficult to discover negative information. Indeed, the available
empirical evidence suggests that although the current regulatory
regime chills negative disclosures, it also permits a considerable
quantity of positive information to flow.'67
Because the line between falsely positive statements and the
omission of material negative information is as arbitrary as the
distinction between action and inaction,' wrongful referral must
necessarily become, at least in part, a legal disclosure obliga-
tion. "'69 Enforcement problems similar to those that afflict conven-
tional disclosure obligations thus would inevitably diminish the
usefulness of the wrongful referral theory. Plaintiffs would face
the difficult and expensive task of proving prior knowledge on the'
part of a former employer. Liability would perversely encourage
employers to make relevant information more difficult to verify.
Anyone injured by an employee tort would have a strategic rea-
son to name former employers as codefendants whenever a fa-
cially colorable factual basis exists for asserting that the former
employer may have known the employee had a propensity to
commit such acts. 70 Finally, the possibility of intervening negli-
gence on the part of the current employer, who controls the work
""In markets like legal academics, job candidates generally select their own refer-
ences. The track record of the person giving the reference and the degree of enthusiasm
with which the reference describes the candidate sometimes allow the recipient to distill a
reasonably accurate signal from the reference.
'See SHRM Survey (cited in note 2).
" For examples of work criticizing this distinction, see Arthur Allen Leff, The LeffDic-
tionary of the Law: A Fragment, 94 Yale L J 1855, 1913-14 (1985) (discussing the concept
of "active cause"); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v Chaney,
52 U Chi L Rev 653, 683 (1985) (arguing that 'inaction' is itself a decision" and applaud-
ing the trend in judicial review treating action and inaction similarly).
"See, for example, Randi W. v Muroc Joint Unified School District, 14 Cal 4th 1066,
929 P2d 582, 593 (1997) (finding misrepresentation liability for failing to disclose com-
plaints of sexual misconduct in the course of providing highly positive recommendation
letters). Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (extending the doctrine of mis-
representation to some forms of nondisclosure).
170Although defamation law also creates a risk of strategically motivated and un-
founded litigation, the marginal increase in the number of suits employers must defend is
less than it would be under a wrongful referral theory. Most employment reference defa-
mation claims are brought in conjunction with statutory discrimination or common law
wrongful discharge actions. See note 19. Because these claims would be brought anyway,
defamation law produces more additional claims than additional suits. In contrast, the
threat of wrongful referral liability would force former employers to defend lawsuits in en-
tirely new factual situations for which they presently have no legal exposure whatsoever.
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environment and determines job assignments, would significantly
cloud the issue of causation.
These problems make me profoundly skeptical that many ju-
risdictions will decide to impose general wrongful referral liabil-
ity. As in the case of targeted disclosure obligations, however, the
benefit from deterring falsely positive references would be great-
est for high-risk occupations. Indeed, the California Supreme
Court's ruling in Randi W. v Muroc Joint Unified School Dis-
trict7' can be understood as establishing a duty narrowly tailored
to the high-risk circumstances in which a "substantial" risk of
physical harm is "foreseeable." These doctrinal requirements give
the court ample flexibility to restrict this new duty to the situa-
tions that I have described here as high-risk employment. Im-
posing a narrowly tailored obligation to disclose accurately and
completely significant risk factors could reduce the incidence of
churning and severe mismatching. Moreover, the framework
shows that it is for high-risk occupations that we should be most
willing to accept the danger of scarring and excessive deterrence
that these new duties entail. Lawmakers could choose either a
tort of wrongful referral or an administrative reporting scheme to
enforce employers' new obligations. Because wrongful referral li-
ability relies on third party, rather than administrative, enforce-
ment, it creates greater risks of strategic litigation. However, a
wrongful referral tort would create fewer concerns about privacy
because it lacks any centralized data collection mechanism. Thus,
reformers might succeed in promoting either a limited adminis-
trative reporting scheme or a wrongful referral tort focused on
readily identifiable high-risk occupations.
D. Market Mechanisms for Information Sharing
The preceding three Sections have shown why lawmakers
might be reluctant to alter the existing regulatory scheme for
employment reference practices. Dramatically expanding the
privilege could increase the quantity of references provided, but
at the expense of eliminating employers' only significant incen-
tive to take care against providing falsely negative references.
Enforcement costs and potentially perverse effects such as scar-
ring and strategic litigation also explain why disclosure obliga-
tions and a tort of wrongful referral have attracted so little judi-
cial or legislative support. It remains in this Section to consider
how the legal regime affects several important market mecha-
"1929 P2d at 584.
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nisms for producing and sharing information about prospective
employees.72
Informational intermediaries such as private investigation
services, executive search consultants, and headhunters are the
principal actors in the market for reference information. 7 ' These
intermediaries each operate on a distinctive business model, but
a common characteristic of their activities is that they provide to
employers information about job applicants in exchange for
monetary compensation. The intermediaries themselves and their
sources of information are subject to the strictures of defamation
law. Nevertheless, the available evidence, although fragmentary
and anecdotal, suggests that there is a thriving market for their
services. 74 These market transactions demonstrate not only that
the information they provide is valuable but, perhaps more sig-
nificantly, that the current law of defamation is not so draconian
that it chills all useful communications about prospective em-
ployees.
Despite the evident success of these informational interme-
diaries, one type of transaction is conspicuously absent from the
market. Neither employers nor intermediaries pay other employ-
ers to reveal information about former employees. Employers
may be uncertain about each party's legal responsibilities and
therefore find such a transaction unattractive. But defamation li-
ability is insurable,'75 and thus the parties should expect a court
to enforce almost any indemnification agreement or assignment
of liability that they might devise.'
"As I have observed already, employers sometimes attempt to contract out of defama-
tion liability. The legal effect of prospective waivers and of an employee's consent to obtain
references is uncertain. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text. Use of these contractual
devices to create the equivalent of an absolute privilege undermines the incentive effects
of defamation liability and therefore creates a substantial risk of scarring. In this Section,
I focus instead on alternative market mechanisms that preserve defamation liability and
therefore provide greater protection against scarring.
1 See, for example, William T. Hill, Getting Help from the Outside, Security Manage-
ment 15A (July 1, 1990) (discussing nationwide private investigation agencies and the
newest technological tools used for preemployment screening); Angela Ahn, Headhunters
Battle Second Class Image, Houston Chron 9 (July 20, 1986) (reporting that there are
more than 1,500 executive search firms in business today with over half of those estab-
lished in the past twenty years).
1 See, for example, Bob Smith, Pinkerton Keeps Its Eye on Recruitment, HR Focus 1, 6
(Sept 1993) (discussing an investigation company that screens more than one million job
applicants annually).
1See, for example, Ruder & Finn, Inc v Seaboard Surety Co, 52 NY2d 663, 439
NYS2d 858, 422 NE2d 518, 521 (1981) (enforcing policy providing express coverage for
defamation actions).
... I am referring here to contracts allocating liability between the referring employer,
an informational intermediary, and the ultimate recipient of reference information. We
saw earlier that, in several jurisdictions, a contract for a prospective waiver of defamation
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A more likely explanation for the absence of such payments
is the difficulty that the parties would have determining how to
price the information. A flat rate for each reference would have to
be low enough to make the purchase worthwhile even though, in
the majority of cases, the former employer will have nothing
valuable to disclose. If the price per reference is therefore quite
low, employers who know particularly damaging information will
be disinclined to expose themselves to potential defamation i-
ability in return for such a trivial sum. 1 7 Any attempt to tie com-
pensation to the value of the information disclosed, however, cre-
ates a perverse incentive for former employers to manufacture
negative information in order to earn these larger payments. Al-
though defamation liability undoubtedly constrains this ten-
dency, the fear of such strategic behavior surely might dissuade a
prospective employer or informational intermediary from making
a variable payment offer. As a result, one striking characteristic
of reference information may be that it is only valuable when the
original source of that information has given it away for free.
Although individual reference-for-payment transactions do
not occur, an ongoing reciprocal arrangement to exchange refer-
ence information with other employers or with an informational
intermediary would not violate this principle of free disclosure.
One employer might agree with other local employers to provide
candid assessments of former employees who apply to work for
those other employers. In return, the other employers would dis-
close similar information about their former employees."8 Since
each disclosure depends only on an employer's expectations of fu-
ture reciprocal exchanges, rather than on the marginal fee pay-
able for that individual reference, the problems associated with
variable payment would not distort the employer's incentive to
disclose. Employers also could hope that the value of the ongoing
exchange would be sufficient to overcome the problem of nondis-
closure that afflicts a flat-fee payment scheme. After hiring a job
liability is void as contrary to public policy. See note 47 and accompanying text. This judi-
cial resistance to contractual devices that extinguish a victim's right to sue for defamation
does not appear to extend to contracts allocating the financial burden of defamation li-
ability among third parties.
'"From the perspective of a referring employer, receiving a small payment in ex-
change for particularly negative information is virtually indistinguishable from providing
the information for free. A flat-fee payment scheme could include a contractual duty to
disclose all relevant information. As we have seen, however, problems of verifiability and
strategic litigation make such disclosure obligations costly to enforce. See text accompa-
nying notes 69-70.
'"See, for example, Charles P. McConnell, How Dangerous Is the Truth in Employ-
ment References? 12 Health Care Superv 1, 11-12 (1993) (noting that hospital personnel
departments often share reference information in the health care industry).
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applicant, the recipient of a reference ordinarily would discover a
former employer's failure to disclose negative information. Pre-
sumably, too many incidents of nondisclosure would cause the re-
cipient to terminate the reciprocal relationship. 9
Of course, this technique for obtaining information only
works when a group of employers can expect a reasonably con-
tinuous exchange of references. An informational intermediary,
however, may be able to overcome this limitation by contracting
with a larger number of employers and using its own investment
in reputation to bond the accuracy of the references it provides.
The intermediary conceivably could charge a flat fee for all refer-
ences. The intermediary's desire to maintain a market reputation
for full disclosure might be sufficient to prevent it from with-
holding negative information in order to avoid the risk of defama-
tion liability.
Regrettably, other problems make the ultimate success of
such a venture somewhat doubtful. Although the intermediary's
reputational stake in accuracy is clear, inadequate incentives ex-
ist to ensure that the sources of reference information-referring
employers-will disclose significant negative information. First, a
referring employer must retain liability for defamatory references
in order to maintain its incentive to avoid providing falsely nega-
tive references. 80 But the risk of defamation liability creates an
incentive for the referring employer to withhold negative infor-
mation. The only sanction with which the intermediary can pe-
nalize falsely negative or incomplete disclosure is to sever its re-
lationship with the referring employer. Unless this relationship is
quite valuable, the sanction will be ineffective. Indeed, if there
are alternative intermediaries with whom the employer could
contract in the future, then the threat of termination almost cer-
tainly cannot ensure complete disclosure.
Even if a more meaningful sanction were available, the
mechanism by which the intermediary could hope to learn of in-
complete disclosures would be indirect and unreliable. The ulti-
"However, the inference of nondisclosure would be quite uncertain. Without con-
ducting a detailed investigation of an employee's prior conduct, an employer cannot know
whether the employee's former employer has observed behavior that manifested a propen-
sity for misconduct. As my description of experience traits made clear, a prior employer
might well be ignorant of such significant traits as recklessness or a tendency to violence.
See text accompanying notes 66-68.
"If the intermediary agreed to assume the risk of defamation liability, the referring
employer would be in the enviable position of receiving whatever benefits flow from pro-
viding references and bearing none of the costs. The intermediary's only available sanction
for falsely negative references would be to sever its relationship with the offending em-
ployer.
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mate recipient of the reference information would have to dis-
cover the incompleteness and inform the intermediary that the
disclosure was inadequate. The intermediary would then have to
determine whether the recipient's complaint or the referring em-
ployer's denial was more credible. Even more tellingly, recipients
of potentially incomplete references might simply decide not to do
business with the intermediary again, never explaining the cause
of their dissatisfaction. Intermediaries could not realistically
hope to decode such indistinct signals and hold referring employ-
ers responsible for the resulting loss of business.''
These obstacles to market transactions are most easily over-
come when the stakes are high. Indeed, employers hiring for jobs
at the "high end" of the labor market-positions in the upper lev-
els of management, for example-appear to use informational in-
termediaries quite extensively.'82 The evident success of the mar-
ket for high-value reference information suggests that it is worth
considering whether legal regulation could perhaps facilitate
market devices for producing and sharing useful information in
the rest of the labor market. In short, is there any chance that
reference information for ordinary jobs will become a widely
traded commodity?
The limitations we have just considered impede intermedi-
aries' efforts to extend the routine exchange of information be-
yond the narrow reciprocal setting of small groups of employers.
Nevertheless, many third party investigative services presently
conduct routine reference checks and investigate job applicants
on a fee-for-service basis.'83 These private investigators realize
economies of scale and develop special skills for discovering rele-
vant information.' Investigative services thus trade on their
... Intermediaries also would have to cope with a significant timing problem. It would
be difficult for them to ensure that they had current information about each job applicant
for whom employers would seek references. One way of dealing with this problem might
be to conduct an investigation and collect information on demand. This approach creates
the potential for substantial delay and resembles quite closely the sort of investigative ef-
fort that the employer might easily undertake by itself. As I discuss below, however, a
thriving market exists for investigation on demand. Thus, it appears that these timing
problems alone would not prevent a broader market for reference information from suc-
ceeding.
'.Although the market for reference information thrives at the high end of the labor
market, I have discovered no evidence that original sources receive payment for their dis-
closures.
See notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
For example, they develop expertise in obtaining access to and an understanding of
useful computer databases. They also gain experience that may show them how best to
approach former employers to induce them to part with information. Finally, they discover
who else to ask for relevant information (neighbors or local merchants, for example).
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specialization of labor to displace or supplement pre-employment
investigations that employers could perform themselves.
The FCRA supplements the common law of defamation as it
applies to the "investigative consumer reports" that these serv-
ices prepare.'85 However, because Congress designed the FCRA
principally to correct flaws in the operation of the market for
credit information,8 ' its provisions are best adapted to regulate
information of that type. First, the FCRA provides several proce-
dural protections to "consumers," including notice that an inves-
tigative report will be prepared, notice of an adverse decision
based on information in a report, and an opportunity to challenge
the accuracy of information contained in a report.'87 These re-
quirements prevent lenders from denying credit on the basis of
secret information and give consumers a fair opportunity to cor-
rect errors in their credit record." To encourage potential sources
of credit information to divulge what they know, the FCRA also
codifies a conditional privilege for all participants in the credit
reporting process.8 9 This conditional privilege appears to be suffi-
cient to induce creditors to disclose the necessary information to
credit reporting bureaus.
One important explanation for the continued vitality of the
credit reporting industry is the fact that credit information is ob-
jective and verifiable. 9 ' In contrast, employment references nor-
mally include subjective performance assessments. Any negative
judgments contained in those references necessarily imply the
" See 15 USC §§ 1681 et seq (1994). See also text accompanying notes 50-54.
'"The FCRA's section containing "[c]ongressional findings and statement of purpose"
begins with the finding that, "[tihe banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate
credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking
system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public confidence which is es-
sential to the continued functioning of the banking system." 15 USC § 1681(aX1). Tell-
ingly, there are no analogous findings concerning the use of consumer reports for employ-
ment purposes. Instead, the statute refers to "other information on consumers" and to
"personnel, insurance, and other information" almost as an afterthought. See 15 USC
§ 1681(aX3), (b).
'"See 15 USC §§ 1681i, 1681k, 1681m.
"See 15 USC § 1681(b) (emphasizing adoption of procedures "fair and equitable to the
consumer").
" 15 USC § 1681h(e) (1994).
'A creditor who discloses a debtor's payment history is unlikely to make a mistake,
and it will be extremely difficult to prove that any mistake was willful or malicious. See id.
For normal credit information, the most common problem is almost certainly inadvertent
clerical errors in reporting. A conditional privilege provides predictable protection against
the threat of defamation liability in these circumstances. Providers of credit information
also are far less likely than employers to have the sort of personal relationship with delin-
quent debtors that could provide a factual basis for alleging malice or a willful intent to
injure. Comparatively anonymous creditors are thus far more likely to find the protection
of the conditional privilege entirely adequate.
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existence of potentially defamatory facts. 9' Moreover, the under-
lying observations that support employers' performance apprais-
als are often far more difficult to verify than a debtor's payment
history. In order to defend the truth of their negative judgments,
employers must testify about employee shortcomings such as in-
ept or lackadaisical job performance, insubordinate comments or
behavior, and the amorphous problem of a "bad attitude." Evi-
dence that is so inherently fluid and indefinite can never be suffi-
cient to prevail on summary judgment and often leaves an em-
ployer uncertain about the likely outcome at trial. Thus, perhaps
employment reference reporting bureaus have not arisen because
of this comparatively greater exposure to defamation liability.
The increased threat of suit for defamation prevents employers
from sharing what they know about former employees as freely
as banks and other creditors share information about their cus-
tomers. Indeed, it is hard to imagine an employer uttering the
threat: "Improve your performance or we will report you to the
employment reference reporting bureau," even though creditors
routinely issue analogous threats to delinquent creditors.
Lawmakers concerned about this problem could consider
amending the FCRA to confer an absolute privilege on those who
provide employment references. Such complete protection against
the threat of defamation liability presumably would encourage
employers to supply a larger quantity of candid reference infor-
mation. As we have seen, however, defamation law is necessary
to force employers to consider the costs that falsely negative ref-
erences impose on their former employees. 9" Nevertheless, we
also have seen that the availability of alternative devices for
combating the ill effects of falsely negative references can some-
times justify an absolute privilege, as it does for statements made
in a judicial proceeding.'93 Lawmakers could expand the existing
protections of the FCRA to include a final and binding procedure
for resolving disputes about the accuracy of information con-
tained in an investigative report.' Such an amended FCRA
would offer former employees protection against falsely negative
'"See note 16.
See Section IA
'See text accompanying notes 137-39.
'"The existing FCRA procedure inadequately protects employees since it permits even
potentially inaccurate information to remain in the report with only a summary of the
employee's objections to it. See 15 USC § 1681i. A prospective employer is likely to believe
the original source of information rather than a job applicant's self-serving exculpatory
statement.
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references roughly comparable to the adversarial setting of judi-
cial proceedings.
Although reforms or new regulatory schemes modeled after
the FCRA may warrant further investigation and even some ex-
perimentation, two significant objections stand as obstacles to
their wide acceptance. First, the costs of resolving disputes over
the accuracy of reference information might well overwhelm the
value of the information that the system could provide. Only a
system that allows employees to resort to an objective third party
decisionmaker could hope to provide a sufficient guarantee
against falsely negative references. But the ultimate decision-
maker inevitably would confront all of the uncertainties associ-
ated with the unverifiable information on which references are
customarily based. Another significant problem is that an
amended FCRA could be expected to trigger complaints that it
encourages employment reference reporting bureaus to intrude
on employees' personal privacy. 195
The rhetorical and political power of the privacy objection
suggests that reference reporting bureaus might be feasible if
they were carefully limited to high-risk occupations for which the
countervailing social interest in full disclosure is most clear. The
framework shows that such a targeted approach could combat se-
vere mismatching. Thus, a well articulated regulatory scheme for
reference reporting bureaus could generally protect against scar-
ring, while allowing those who have a particular need for infor-
mation to acquire it. In this sense, the most promising avenues
for reform may mimic the successful sectors of the existing mar-
ket for information by catering to the needs of high-value con-
sumers of information.
CONCLUSION
It is something of a puzzle that so many commentators have
complained that defamation law prevents employers from pro-
viding enough candid reference information, and yet lawmakers
have shown little inclination to alter fundamentally the existing
regulatory scheme. The analytic framework that I have developed
in this Article provides a new and more rigorous understanding of
the problems that regulators confront in attempting to influence
employment reference practices. We have seen that incomplete
and asymmetric information causes three interrelated inefficien-
cies: mismatching, churning, and scarring. These labor market
1
'On the peculiar American aversion to centralized data collection, see Gandy, The
Panoptic Sort at ch 5-6 (cited in note 152).
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problems arise spontaneously from the efforts of employers to
maximize the productivity of their labor force and the simultane-
ous efforts of employees to maximize the satisfaction they derive
from employment. Mismatching, churning, and scarring interact
with one another in complex ways, and neither regulatory meas-
ures nor market forces can produce an efficient full-information
equilibrium.
By examining each of the basic problems facing regulators
through the lens of this framework, I have generated a number of
positive predictions and a corresponding set of normative justifi-
cations regarding the shape of legal regulation. Falsely negative
references cause scarring, and no market mechanism adequately
internalizes the resulting costs to employees. Thus, defamation
law serves the important role of ensuring that employers take
adequate precautions against providing falsely negative refer-
ences. The conditional privilege encourages employers to provide
a larger quantity of references. However, the framework shows
that lawmakers face substantial uncertainty about the extent of
protection that optimally balances the quantity and quality of
available information. Both disclosure obligations and a tort of
wrongful referral create difficult enforcement problems that ex-
plain why they have not been adopted more widely. These more
aggressive regulatory cures for the activity-level problem and for
falsely positive references may well be worse than the disease.
Finally, we saw that although a robust market for reference in-
formation can likely be maintained in high-value sectors of the
labor market, both practical and political constraints would im-
pede regulatory efforts to encourage innovative market mecha-
nisms for supplying reference information to the "low end" of the
labor market.
This Article makes three central claims. First, as a matter of
positive theory, it explains features of the existing legal regula-
tion of employment reference practices. It also offers an account
of why lawmakers have been reluctant to eviscerate defamation
liability, to impose disclosure obligations, or to adopt a wrongful
referral tort. Second, the analysis provides a normative argument
for differentiating the treatment of employees in high-risk occu-
pations, and thus also helps to explain those aspects of existing
law that draw such a distinction. Finally, the analysis of market
mechanisms for information sharing shows the problems that
lawmakers would confront in attempting to help employers de-
velop more efficient means for collecting and disseminating in-
formation about prospective employees. Deeply seated aversions
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to centralized data collection also may make such efforts politi-
cally unacceptable.
The framework with which I have analyzed employment ref-
erence practices also applies more generally to any form of regu-
lation affecting either employee turnover or the acquisition and
use of information about employees. For example, disability dis-
crimination law broadly prohibits employers from discriminating
against otherwise qualified persons with a disability.9 ' The
Americans with Disabilities Act bars employers from inquiring
about job applicants' possible disabilities and imposes on employ-
ers a duty of reasonable accommodation. 9 ' The analysis of mis-
matching, churning, and scarring provides a useful framework for
understanding the function of these legal duties. The duty of rea-
sonable accommodation prevents churning by requiring employ-
ers to retain disabled workers in circumstances in which dis-
charge would be unlikely to improve the quality of the match be-
tween worker and job. In addition, the prohibition on inquiring
about an applicant's possible disability can be interpreted as an
effort to prevent scarring because employers might refuse to hire
disabled workers on the basis of this imprecise signal. Thus, just
as the analytical framework has produced new insights about the
legal regulation of employment reference practices, it could bring
a new functional perspective to bear on disability discrimination
law.
'See Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub L No 101-536, Title 1 § 102, 104 Stat 331
(1990), codified as amended at 42 USC § 12112(a) (1994) ("No covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.").
See 42 USC §§ 12112(b)(5XA), 12112(dX2XA).
